Notice bibliographique
Résumé
I. INTRODUCTION The preference provisions in the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act1 (BIA) have been virtually unchanged since the legislation was enacted in 1919,2 and many of their features derive from the nineteenth century and earlier English law. There have been various reform proposals over the years, but until now they have come nothing. Most recently, in 2003 a Senate Committee recommended amendments to ensure consistent and simplified rules for challenging fraudulent preferences, but without explaining what was wrong with the current laws and how they should be changed.3 Recently enacted amendments aim put the Senate Committee's recommendation into effect, but is still no clear sense of the underlying objective.4 In any event, are drafting problems, which will be explained later, and these will have be fixed if the amendments are have any impact at all. The drafting problems were at least in part a function of the failure address policy objectives. This paper argues that: (1) the current Canadian preference provisions are deficient because: (a) they lack a clear policy foundation, (b) judicial glosses on the statutory text mean that the statute itself is an incomplete statement of the law; and (c) the amount of discretion the provisions give the courts results in inconsistent and unpredictable case outcomes; (2) these problems should be fixed, but meaningful reform is impossible unless we first decide what we want the preference laws achieve;5 and (3) Canada's lawmakers should address the policy choices before proceeding further with the current reform initiative. Part II surveys the evolution of preference law in common law countries and the competing policy objectives. Part III provides an overview of the current Canadian provisions and critically analyzes them with reference the policy objectives identified in Part II. Part IV describes the most recent reform initiative and critically analyzes it with reference the policy objectives identified in Part II. Part V concludes. II. THE EVOLUTION OF PREFERENCE LAW AND POLICY A. The Debtor Deterrence Rationale Broadly speaking, a preference is a payment of money or a transfer of property made by a debtor a creditor on the eve of the debtor's bankruptcy, representing more than the amount the creditor would recover in the debtor's bankruptcy distribution. Early preference law developed through case authority. In The case of Bankrupts (Smith v. Mills), Lord Coke stated the rationale for the avoidance of preferences in terms of the need preserve the principle of equal distribution underlying the bankruptcy laws: there ought be an equal distribution ..... .[for] if, after the debtor becomes a bankrupt, he may prefer [a creditor] and defeat and defraud many other poor men of their true debts, it would be unequal and unconscionable, and a great defect in the law.6 Lord Mansfield expressed a similar view in Alderson v. Temple? According Dickson J. in Hudson v. Benallack, this is still the policy of Canadian preference law: The object of the bankruptcy law is ensure the division of the property of the debtor rateably among all his creditors in the event of his bankruptcy .... . . .The Act is intended put all creditors upon an equal footing. Generally, until a debtor is insolvent or has an act of bankruptcy in contemplation, he is quite free deal with his property as he wills and he may prefer one creditor over another but, upon becoming insolvent, he can no longer do any act out of the ordinary course of business which has the effect of preferring a particular creditor over other creditors. If one creditor receives a preference over other creditors as a result of the debtor acting intentionally and in fraud of the law, this defeats the equality of the bankruptcy laws.8 The following statement from Re Norris, an Alberta Court of Appeal decision, makes the point even more clearly: . …
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Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,002 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».