Misunderstanding Mars And Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure To Define an Operational Doctrine

Between 1993 and 1995, while serving as the secretary of the Canadian Land Force Doctrine and Tactics Board, the author participated extensively in the process of doctrinal change which eventually resulted in the publishing of new ‘capstone’ operational and tactical level doctrine manuals in 1996-1997. These manuals introduce ‘manoeuvre warfare’ as the official doctrine of the Army. Adoption of manoeuvre warfare came after years of sporadic debate over revision of the 1985 Combat Systems Studies - which focused exclusively upon a defensive scenario in central Europe. The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Germany in 1993 made the operational context of the Systems Studies irrelevant, leading to a search for new doctrine. The theory of manoeuvre warfare emerged as an attractive alternative. This monograph examines whether or not ‘manouevre warfare’ is an appropriate operational doctrine for the Canadian Army in 2000 and beyond. The research emphasized a counterintuitive approach, critically examining the theory of manoeuvre warfare by investigating its origins and evolution in western military thinking. Four categories of documentary evidence were utilized: contemporary doctrine publications (US, British and Canadian) allowed comparison of current definitions and roles of military doctrine; published works of modern military history helped to determine the historical role of doctrine in the preparation of armies for war and the legitimacy of manoeuvre warfare as a distinct style of war; the published works of prominent military theorists are used to substantiate the theoretical foundations of manoeuvre warfare and its role vis-à-vis operational art; and contemporary Canadian policy and doctrine publications were reviewed to establish how relevant manoeuvre warfare is to Canada’s strategic goals and to current operational realities. An analysis of the role of doctrine in the Land Force Management Process was conducted, using ‘general systems theory’ to illustrate deficiencies. As well, the ‘operational concept’ of manoeuvre warfare was analyzed using the theory of ‘operational art’ to illustrate the shortcomings of our current doctrine. There are two important conclusions presented as a result of the research. Firstly, manoeuvre warfare does not have the necessary theoretical foundation to allow it to become comprehensive doctrine, of use in all aspects Force Management, in war preparation, and in the conduct of operations. Its utility does not extend beyond its use as a conceptual model to help understand tactical-level combat in specific scenarios. This works against the achievement of a true ‘systems approach’ to Force Management. Secondly, manoeuvre warfare is not linked to any specific strategic aims, or to any Canadian Army operations currently planned or being executed. Therefore it lacks operational-level utility, and does not facilitate operational-level cognition. The theory of manoeuvre warfare is predicated upon understanding an attrition-manoeuvre dichotomy that demands explicit acknowledgment of manoeuvre warfare as a superior style of fighting. Therefore, it fails to recognize operational art as the means to reconcile such dichotomies, and to achieve coherence in the full utilization of all combat functions throughout an entire theatre of war. As doctrine manoeuvre warfare is non-integrative and fixed at the tactical level. This could potentially diminish the ability of Canadian commanders to understand in full the complex phenomenon of war. The monograph ends with the recommendation that the Canadian Army reformulate and re-write its capstone doctrine, basing new doctrine upon a clearly defined operational concept that is consistent with strategic imperatives and with current operational commitments. This re-write should not plagiarize foreign doctrine, but must reflect Canadian intellectual appreciation of operational art and a systems approach to preparation for conflict.

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