The 1998 Canadian Bank Merger Decision and the 2008 Financial Crisis: Factual and Counterfactual Investigations
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
The observed stability of large Canadian banks during the 2008 financial crisis, in contrast with several American and European counterparts, poses a puzzle.This puzzle is explored through three essays, each pursuing a question with a different method.Yet all three are linked to the historic interlude marked by the 1998 government rejection of proposed mergers of four large Canadian banks and by the 2008 crisis when the banks remained stable.Essay One is a The genesis of this dissertation reaches back to the completion of my bachelor's degree at Dalhousie University in 1996, when outstanding questions about economics led me to later study the methodology of economics at the University of Ottawa through a master's degree between 2000 and 2003.Along the way, I recall the announcement of proposed bank mergers in 1998.While a prominent question at the time was whether consolidation would lead to the greater concentration in the Canadian banking industry, there was less thought to the consequences for bank stability.The years at Ottawa involved not only the study of methodology and heterodox economics under the supervision of Dr. Mario Seccareccia but also working with Mario as his teaching assistant for Canadian economic history.It was there where we began a discussion about the merits of the counterfactual method.It was also during these years when I decided that I would only undertake a doctorate if a question of sufficient interest revealed itself to me.The fall 2007 was pivotal: I married Brenna MacNeil and began working at the federal Department of Finance, all the while an international financial crisis began to gather.The Department was a good vantage point from which to observe the unfolding crisis and the public responses to it.It was here where I became interested in the puzzle of Canadian bank stability and wondered about the role of the 1998 bank merger decision.With our second daughter having just been born, Brenna supported me taking a leave of absence from the public service to begin this doctorate in September 2011.This set of three essays took time to shape, but ultimately came together through the committed supervision of my three-person committee.Early in the journey, Dr. Saul Schwartz expressed intrigue (rather than fear) with the challenge of a counterfactual exercise.Saul offered to be part of committee, and ultimately became my project's overall coordinator as well as supervisor for Essay Two and coach in matters academic and intellectual.One of my regrets of finishing this doctorate is that I will no longer benefit from our regular meetings.Dr. Seccareccia accepted my invitation to extend our early discussions about Canadian economic history and the counterfactual method by acting as supervisor of Essay Three.I am fortunate to have had Mario as a teacher for close to twenty years.Finally, it was a chance glance at Dr. Randall Germain's 2010 book on financial governance that led me to his office in Carleton's political science department.Through supervising Essay One, Randall introduced me to the thought of Robert Cox, notably his "method of historical structures".In hindsight, this introduction was a watershed moment in the evolution of my dissertation's overall framework, and more generally my intellectual orientation, given the links between Cox's framework and my early exploration of economic methodology.I have been blessed to have had these three scholars provide the necessary guidance and nudges to move me along my journey.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,041 | 0,158 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,002 | 0,004 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,005 | 0,007 |
| Communication savante | 0,007 | 0,003 |
| Science ouverte | 0,003 | 0,002 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,005 | 0,004 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,005 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».