No More Old Boys’ Club: Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary Duty to Diversify Corporate Boards
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
One of the highly contested issues today in corporate law and governance revolves around boardroom diversity, with an emphasis on gender diversity. In recent decades, unfortunately, despite the fact that women’s economic and political status have advanced significantly in the United States and around the world, women have yet to achieve parity with men on issues concerning representation and participation in the corporate world.This is evidenced by the stark lack of representation of female directors in the boardrooms of major public and private corporations.There are increasing calls for action from various groups, including academics and regulators. The following are some of the theories (rationales) calling to promote the election of women as directors, such as social issues, public good, organizational strategy, fair employment practices, and corporate governance. Such theories focus on the advancement of women and narrowing the gender salary gap, women’s contribution to society and the corporation (board of directors), diversity in the boardroom, taking stakeholder interests into account (employee motivation and improving customer loyalty), and even empirical studies that show that there is a direct correlation between having a certain percentage of women on the board and enhanced corporate (economic) performance.Some believe that this issue should be addressed through legislation and diversity initiatives. For example, there is an increase in quotas, regulation initiatives, the use of ESG disclosure requirements and soft law instruments (such as stewardship codes). This paper will review the recent rise (over the last twenty years) of institutional investors, who own an increasing share of public equity markets on the one hand, and the need to elect women to the boardroom on the other. The main argument is that institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to advance the goals of their beneficiaries (the individuals who invest in these institutions). Managers of financial institutions are subject to various enhanced fiduciary obligations, which require them to take board diversity concerns into account, due to the fact that they are serving as stewards to their beneficiaries and the portfolio companies. In light of the duties of the board of directors, the current regulatory framework, (and shifts in institutional investors market and legal powers), institutional investors have a duty to take into account the question of women representation in the boardroom in the corporations in which they invest. They also need to consider generally the ways in which they vote on appointment of directors to the board.There are several ramifications for breaching a fiduciary duty, such as litigation involving derivative actions, claims for breach of fiduciary duty, or proxy violations on behalf of individual (and/or institutional investors). These claims in the USA, for example, can be brought in state or federal courts (depending on the nature of the claim).
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,004 | 0,010 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,004 | 0,005 |
| Communication savante | 0,007 | 0,004 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,004 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,005 | 0,005 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,015 | 0,002 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».