Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Introduction The government of Alberta recently passed the Crown's Right of Recovery Act (1) (the Act), which will enable the Province to recover the costs of health services from automobile accidents, convicted persons, and, perhaps most significantly, tobacco manufacturers. Alberta's legislation received Royal Assent in November of 2009. It is the second last province to enact legislation that enables the provincial government to litigate against tobacco manufacturers in order to recoup health care costs. (2) Over the last several decades, tobacco litigation has had a steadfast presence in the courts, both in Canada and internationally. Health care cost recovery is the latest and, arguably, most successful, trend in tobacco litigation. The Act has already garnered some attention, but not for its attempt to recover costs from tobacco manufacturers. (3) There has been little discussion concerning the power the Act confers upon the province of Alberta to sue tobacco companies. This may be a reflection of the fact that suing tobacco companies to recover health care costs, and the controversy that comes with such litigation, is old news. Alberta's legislation was preceded over a decade earlier by legislation in British Columbia. (4) It may also reflect the growing recognition in society that tobacco use is associated with increased health care costs, even for non-smokers. The following article intends to situate the Act within the context of tobacco litigation, particularly as it pertains to the state's right of recovery. It will begin with a brief examination of the Act before situating it within the broader context of right of recovery legislation and litigation. This will include a discussion of the origin and development of right of recovery statutes, the challenges and critiques that right of recovery statutes face, and of some of the possible outcomes and issues associated with litigation. The Crown's Right of Recovery Act In many respects, the Crown's Right of Recovery Act is identical to its predecessor in British Columbia, the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act. (5) The Supreme Court of Canada's ruling that British Columbia's legislation is constitutional (6) is undoubtedly the reason why Alberta and the majority of provinces have adopted legislation that is virtually identical. In light of the similarities, and the fact that British Columbia's legislation has been subject to considerable attention in the courts and in the literature, it is unnecessary to thoroughly review Alberta's legislation. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to highlight some its key provisions. The Act extends to the province of Alberta a direct and distinct action against a manufacturer to recover the Crown's cost of health services caused or contributed to by a tobacco-related wrong (s. 42(1)). The cost of health services is defined as the sum of the total expenditure by the province for health services provided for insured persons as well as the estimated expenditures that could be reasonably expected will be provided to insured persons that have resulted from tobacco-related disease or the risk of tobacco-related disease (s. 41(1)(a)). The term 'health services', in turn, is broadly defined and includes, among other things, in- and out-patient services, services as defined in Alberta Health Care insurance Act, and public health services. The parties that the province can seek recovery from are considered manufacturers. Under the Act, manufacturers include any person who manufactures or has manufactured a tobacco (s. 41(1)(i). This definition includes, among others, persons who cause the manufacturing of tobacco products (s. 41(1)(i)(i)), derive at least 10% of revenues from the manufacture or promotion of tobacco products (s. 41(1)(i)(ii)), or engage in or cause others to engage in the promotion of a tobacco product (s. 41(1)(i)(iii)). The legislation does not specifically address what is meant by disease. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».