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Is Changing Patent Infringement Liability the Appropriate Mechanism for Allocating the Cost of Pollen Drift

2006· article· en· W299746449 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Tim van Pelt

Notice bibliographique

Revue˜The œJournal of corporation law · 2006
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineAgricultural and Biological Sciences
ThématiqueGenetically Modified Organisms Research
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésIntellectual propertyContext (archaeology)LiabilityPatent infringementLegislationLaw and economicsEconomicsLawBusinessPolitical scienceBiology
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

I. INTRODUCTION Now that plants are patentable subject matter, new issues are arising in the context of patent infringement because of the ability of plants to spread through pollen drift and naturally propagate without human intervention. Part II introduces this issue in the context of Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser.1 Part II also provides background on the history and science behind genetically modified plants as well as the development of intellectual property law with respect to plants. Part III begins by evaluating some of the alternatives available for an alleged infringer that receives patented plant matter from pollen drift. Other commentators have proposed nuisance, trespass, and monopolization as possible counterclaims that an alleged infringer could assert. Part III highlights the drawbacks of these alternatives. It also addresses two possible legislative actions for this issue: (1) requiring an element of intent for infringement in these special situations; or (2) indemnifying infringers who are infringing because of pollen drift. Part III highlights why requiring an element of intent would be impractical in reality. Using Coase's theorem, Part IV analyzes whether indemnifying the passive recipient of pollen drift would actually allocate the cost of pollen drift to the patent holder, assuming this allocation of costs is the desired policy. Part IV concludes that indemnifying legislation is not likely to allocate the cost of pollen drift to the patent holder. This Note suggests that other legal mechanisms, such as regulatory agencies, are better equipped to allocate and enforce the costs of pollen drift. II. BACKGROUND A. The Source of Discussion-Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser 1. The Trial Court Decision In 1996, Percy Schmeiser planted and grew conventional2 canola near Bruno, Saskatchewan.3 At the same time, five neighboring farmers grew Roundup Ready canola.4 One of these Roundup Ready canola fields was diagonally adjacent to Schmeiser's field six,5 while the next closest field was located five miles from field two.6 In 1997, Schmeiser planted his canola crop using seed saved from the 1996 harvest of field one.7 During the 1997 growing season, Schmeiser's routine ditch spraying of Roundup along fields one through four revealed a large number of Roundup-resistant canola plants.8 Schmeiser then conducted a test in field two and found that approximately 60% of the plants were resistant to Roundup herbicide.9 Also during the 1997 growing season, an investigator from Monsanto took seeds from fields two and five.10 Tests on these samples revealed a significant amount of Roundup resistance, indicating that the crop contained the Roundup Ready gene.11 In 1998, Schmeiser planted his canola crop using seed saved from his 1997 harvest of field two.12 During 1998, more samples were taken from Schmeiser's canola fields, with significant amounts testing positive for the Roundup Ready gene.13 Schmeiser and Monsanto disagreed about the amount of Roundup resistance exhibited in Schmeiser's 1998 crop with Schmeiser's tests showing approximately 40% to 50% Roundup resistance,14 while Monsanto's tests showed approximately 95% to 98% resistance.15 Monsanto then sued Schmeiser in 1998, alleging infringement of its Canadian patent number 1,313,830 (the Roundup Ready gene) because Schmeiser had grown and sold canola plants with the patented Roundup Ready gene without a license or consent from Monsanto, the patentee.16 After a trial on the merits, the court made several findings. First, the trial court concluded that the crop samples obtained by Monsanto were admissible evidence.17 second, the court found that Monsanto's patent was valid, rejecting Schmeiser's arguments for invalidity.18 With respect to patent validity, the court concluded that it did not matter whether the patented gene could naturally replicate itself and spread without human intervention.19 Third, the trial court determined that Monsanto did not waive its right to enforce its patent,20 concluding that the manner in which the patented gene arrived onto Schmeiser's property did not matter. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,002
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Expérimental (laboratoire) · Signal consensuel: Expérimental (laboratoire)
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: Empirique
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,351
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,321

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0020,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0000,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,059
Tête enseignante GPT0,248
Écart entre enseignants0,190 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeExpérimental (laboratoire)
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations2
Publié2006
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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