Keeping the Peace and National Unity

Since Lester B. Pearson led Canada onto the major international scene to keep the Suez Crisis antagonists apart in 1956-and won the Nobel peace prize for his efforts-Canada has been seen by many as the world's peacekeeper par excellence: in the space between then and the 19903, Canada participated-and came to be expected to do so by the international community-in every UN-led peacekeeping operation, as well as a few more. Consequently, in this period Canada's role as helpful fixer and honest broker helped construct and sustain the country's international position as a middle power-and thus, in effect, often enabled Canadian governments to punch above their weight in foreign policy.During the foreign affairs ministry of Lloyd Axworthy, which among other developments saw the Lysoen declaration, an explicit focus on the connection between human security and peacebuilding was brought to the forefront. As explored by Bosold and von Bredow in detail elsewhere in this volume, the human security doctrine became a fundamental part of the Canadian foreign policy (CFP) contribution to the international environment. The argument inherited by successive governments came to be that in order to protect the safety and freedom of the individual, peace and stability must be ensured. The Paul Martin acknowledged that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety, or lives.1 Peacekeeping has not been considered the only tool with which to establish the necessary preconditions for human security: Canada's efforts in areas such as the ban on landmines, the proliferation of small arms, children in armed conflict, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court illustrate other aspects emphasized in CFP. National security is sometimes insufficient to guarantee the safety and freedom of individuals, so peacekeeping becomes a central tenet-a means by which to restore peace, order, and good government for people in failed or fragile states.2The Canadian states that [a]s peacekeeping evolves, Canada will serve as a model and, in so doing, develop peace support operations that expand the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.3 The close relationship between human security, peacekeeping, and its role model for the world is firmly established.The discourse on Canadian peacekeeping and middle-powerhood has been and remains powerful, both within and outside Canada, and it carries an appealing, but also slightly simplistic and perhaps even naive message: Canada became an active and leading peacekeeper because as a multicultural, federal society, Canada had something to offer the world-namely its experience and expertise in accommodating ethnic and regional differences. To be sure, Canada has a long history of largely successful accommodation of such differences, and at least to some extent has proven its ability to create from diversity. In the introduction to this issue of the International Journal the question of consistency is brought up. What is referred to here is the coherence (or lack thereof) between externally projected norms and arguments and the domestic application and status of the same norms and arguments within the gidsland itself. In Canada's case, the pressing question would be whether the creeds of unity in diversity and peace, order, and good government are successfully applied at home. Since 1971 Canada has officially defined itself as a multicultural society, which implies the integration into Canadian society of ethnically diverse immigrants, while allowing and encouraging each ethnic group to maintain its distinct cultural characteristics. Interethnic conflict is known in Canada, as elsewhere, and one relevant question is whether these conflicts are handled in a manner consistent with the ideal role model values projected to the world as distinctively Canadian. For consistency to be present would, for instance, require a fluid, rather than a fixed, national identity and the constant critical self-examination that John Erik Possum elsewhere in this issue calls reflexivity. …

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