MétaCan
Menu
← Retour à la cohorte
Enregistrement W3124737828

Board, Ownership Structure & Pay and Firm Performance: A Literature Review

2011· review· en· W3124737828 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Nikhat Afshan, Prerna Chhetri, Sudeepta Pradhan

Notice bibliographique

Revue˜The œICFAI Journal of Corporate Governance · 2011
Typereview
Langueen
DomaineBusiness, Management and Accounting
ThématiqueCorporate Finance and Governance
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésCorporate governanceShareholderMarket for corporate controlProfit maximizationGlobalizationBusinessLiberalizationMultinational corporationMarket economyAccountingEconomicsIndustrial organizationProfit (economics)FinanceMicroeconomics
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

IntroductionCorporate governance as a topic has gained global upsurge both in academia as well as in the corporate level. The separation of ownership and control is what creates the need for corporate governance, which includes mechanisms to ensure prudent decision making and profit maximization. Factors like liberalization and globalization have also accentuated the importance of the concept globally. Globalization has a twofold impact on the economy: it increases the accessibility of world market to the Indian corporate sector; and intensifies the competition in the home market (with multinational firms). This scenario increases the importance of good governance as a factor for survival and competitive advantage and acts as a deciding factor for the creditworthiness of a company (Dwivedi and Jain, 2005). Logically, there is a great difference in the corporate governance structures and systems of different industries and different countries. Authors like Maher and Andersson (1999) classify corporate governance systems, on the basis of degree of ownership and control and on the basis of controlling shareholders, into the outsider systems and the insider systems. The authors further emphasize that governance policies should be product- and market-specific.Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that corporate governance is a means to make sure that managers' activities concentrate on value maximization of the firm. There are several mechanisms like management ownership, corporate control activities, shareholder activism and trading activities which ensure the same. Dwivedi and Jain (2005) opine: Governance parameters include board size, director's shareholding, institutional and foreign shareholding, while the fragmentation in shareholding is captured by public shareholding. Dwivedi and Jain (2005) believe that corporate governance structures and systems vary across countries and industries. However, the authors also state that corporate governance and firm profitability tend to vary for different countries but predictably, depending on the national system of corporate governance.Research works indicate that there exists a correlation between corporate governance and firm profitability; however, it varies across countries based on the national system of corporate governance. A study done by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) found statistically significant differences in the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance in the context of Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the US. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) also found similar results in their study where they took into consideration 12 European countries.The Indian corporate governance system is a hybrid of the Anglo-Saxon governance system prevalent in the US and the UK and the bank-dominated systems prevalent in Germany and Japan (Dwivedi and Jain, 2005). Indian companies rely on external sources of financing like banks and financial institutions. Such institutions are both lenders as well as shareholders in Indian companies. Significant amount of research on corporate governance, focusing on financial performance of firms, has been done in the Indian context also. Factors like ownership structure, board characteristics (size, structure, control type and processes), investment opportunities, corporate governance ratings, pay performance and accounting control have been linked to financial performance. Corporate governance research in India is still in doldrums due to the stringent disclosure practices followed by the Indian corporate sector (Goswami, 2000).In this paper, we review selective literature on relationship between the three aspects of corporate governance and firm performance. The three selected corporate governance parameters are board characteristics, ownership structure and executive pay.The BoardThe board constitutes a very essential part in the functioning of corporate control. Over the last one decade, lots of studies have reported the existence of relationship between the board's composition and firm's level of performance. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,006
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Synthèse · Signal consensuel: Synthèse
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,008
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,027

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,006
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,001
Bibliométrie0,0080,015
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0010,001
Communication savante0,0030,002
Science ouverte0,0010,001
Intégrité de la recherche0,0010,001
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0080,001

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,038
Tête enseignante GPT0,236
Écart entre enseignants0,198 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreSynthèse

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations11
Publié2011
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

Explorer davantage

Même revue˜The œICFAI Journal of Corporate Governance→Même sujetCorporate Finance and Governance→Travaux en français237 207→