Notice bibliographique
Résumé
This thesis explores the role of governance and sponsorship on mutual fund characteristics like advisory contracts, fees and returns. My first and second essays are related to board governance for a special type of mutual funds called closed-end funds (CEFs herein). Unlike corporates and open-end funds, CEFs have unique characteristics like similarity in size and complexity along with compulsory public filings which make them an exemplary laboratory for an examination of questions dealing with corporate finance and investments. \nIn June 2004, the SEC required mutual fund boards to reveal additional information about the inputs and processes involved in advisory contract approvals to help investors make more informed decisions and to encourage independent directors to act more independently when negotiating advisory fees. Using a hand-collected governance panel database of all U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs) during 1994-2013, we examine the effect of this change on advisory fees. We find that the percentage of independent directors is significantly and negatively related with advisory fees only after this event. The maximum (minimum) numbers of advisory fee decreases (increases) occur in the year after the 2004 SEC amendments. We find that advisory-rate decreases are significantly more likely for a CEF with a higher percentage of independent directors after but not before the event even after controlling for post-event board structure changes. Overall, our results support the idea that the 2004 SEC amendments successfully encouraged independent fund directors to act more independently in negotiating advisory fees with fund advisors. \nUsing the same governance data, the second paper explores how CEF governance affects expense ratios, returns and premiums. Independent directors are more effective in monitoring and influencing fund performance measures that are less complex and more directly controllable. The results suggest that CEFs with higher board ownerships are better aligned with shareholders’ interests. Ownerships of directors are positively and significantly associated with most variables that are expected to indicate greater value from the monitoring of directors. Using a dynamic panel two-step system generalized method of moments estimator, the results are robust in the presence of endogeneity concerns (reverse causality, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity). \nIn the third essay, we focus on mutual fund governance at the sponsor level. Taking advantage of the wide variety of sponsors in the Canadian mutual fund market, we examine how different fund sponsorships affect measures of fund performance. We find that cost minimization and manager abilities are important drivers of performance differences among Canadian fixed-income funds differentiated by sponsor and fund types.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,003 | 0,015 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,002 | 0,002 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,002 | 0,003 |
| Communication savante | 0,004 | 0,002 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,002 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,009 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».