MétaCan
Menu
Retour à la cohorte
Enregistrement W320355035

Emerging Army Doctrine: Command and Control

2002· article· en· W320355035 sur OpenAlex
William M. Connor

Pourquoi ce travail est dans la base

Une base qui oublie comment elle a trouvé un travail ne peut pas être vérifiée. Voici les voies qui ont admis celui-ci.

aboutLe titre ou le résumé porte un signal canadien du lexique géographique.
no affAucune affiliation canadienne : ce travail est invisible pour une base fondée sur la seule affiliation.
Aucune affiliation canadienne. Une base fondée sur la seule affiliation (le devis habituel) n'aurait jamais vu ce travail. C'est l'un des travaux qui justifient l'inversion de la base.

Notice bibliographique

RevueMilitary review · 2002
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueMilitary History and Strategy
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésVictoryDoctrineBattleLawCommand and controlAdversaryPublicationOperations researchPolitical scienceComputer scienceHistoryComputer securityEngineeringPoliticsTelecommunications
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

IN MAY 1863, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, outnumbered more than two to one by the Union Army of the Potomac, defeated the Union Army in the of Chancellorsville. This victory was a victory of command and control (C2) rather than one of superior numbers. The Confederate commander, General Robert E. Lee, first had to understand the situation, then move to overcome his initial disadvantage, and finally use superior C2 to defeat his opponent. His victory also stemmed from the fact that the defeated Union commander, Major General Joseph Hooker, although he had seized the initiative in the campaign, displayed poor C2. This example illustrates the value of C2 in conducting successful military operations. The U.S. Army's modern operations and doctrine rely on superior C2 for success. As part of the emerging doctrine to support U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, the U.S. Army will publish C2 doctrine in the new FM 6-0, Command and Control.1 The decision to publish a separate C2 doctrinal FM was made because U.S. Army C2 doctrine has been relatively sparse in its higher doctrinal literature. The 1993 version of FM 100-5, Operations, discusses C2 under the heading, Battle and only amounts to a few pages.2 More C2 doctrine may be found in FM 101-- 5, Staff Organization and Operations, but this is still only about eight pages out of more than 200.(3) Consequently, subordinate branch and echelon manuals have had to develop their own definitions and details of C2, leading to multiple versions of C2 doctrine. A committee effectively decided the Army's C2 doctrine because it lacked a C2 FM to provide details for the concepts in FM 100-5. Joint Publication (JP) 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations, does not provide C2 doctrine explicitly.4 Other sources of joint C2 doctrine are JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), but there is not a single authoritative source.5 Moreover, C2 of land forces has unique requirements that joint doctrine does not address. In contrast, other services and armies have published C2 doctrinal manuals. The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps have all published their C2 doctrine in separate manuals-Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-8, Command and Control Doctrine; Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6, Naval Command and Control; and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control.6 The British Army has published its C2 doctrine in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 2, Command, as has the Canadian Armed Forces in Canadian Forces Publication (CFP) 300(3), Command.7 FM 3-0 recognizes information explicitly as an element of combat power and sets guidelines on the meaning. Central to exercising C2, leaders use information to generate understanding and then use that understanding to make decisions that lead to effective actions. FM 6-0 amplifies those concepts in FM 3-0. Doctrine must guide the development and use of modern information technologies and their powerful ability to influence the conduct of operations. If not, the technology, or those developing the technology, will require the forces to exercise C2 its way. For example, during development of the Army Command System (ABCS), the contractors asked that doctrine be written to label all operation order (OPORD) annexes after F as F1, F2, and F3 because their program did not recognize OPORD annex designations higher than F. What is in the C2 FM FM 6-0 provides a common framework for C2 doctrine. This common framework is a common language and defines essential terms to discuss, describe, and develop C2 at schools and centers. It firmly establishes mission command as a C2 concept that best fits the doctrine of full-spectrum operations and uses modern technology to support soldiers. FM 6-0 centers on the commander rather than the staff and focuses on execution rather than planning in the operations process. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesCharge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: Sans objet
GenreSignal candidat: Synthèse · Signal consensuel: Synthèse
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,511
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,997

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0000,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0040,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,030
Tête enseignante GPT0,288
Écart entre enseignants0,258 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle