David Papineau, "The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience."

In his new book, e Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau defends a novel theory of the metaphysics of perception called the qualitative view, on which conscious sensory experiences are only extrinsically and contingently representational and are instead constituted by qualitative elements that are fundamentally non-representational. is view, though having noteworthy similarities with both traditional adverbialism and the familiar qualia-theoretic views of Ned Block and Christopher Peacocke, represents a new and important -and unduly neglectedthird option besides the much better-known nave realist and representationalist accounts on which the contemporary debate focuses.Papineau does an admirable job of motivating the position and establishing that it should be taken seriously by those engaged in the current perception debate.e book will repay close reading by all those working on the metaphysics of perception, as well as in related areas, including, for example, the theory of mental content and the epistemology of mind.It is well-written and accessible to those without much background knowledge, and will constitute an essential resource for students and academics alike.e book is structured into four chapters, following a helpful stage-setting Introduction.Chapter engages briefly with nave realism and the sense-datum theory, and distinguishes the qualitative view from standard forms of representationalism.Chapter develops an extended critique of representationalism, presenting new and important challenges to underdiscussed aspects of that view.Chapters and develop the qualitative view in much more detail, drawing relevant comparisons with related qualia-theoretic and adverbialist accounts.Papineau rejects the sense-datum theory for standard reasons, including the well-known concern that there is no place for sense-data in a physicalist ontology (pp.-).Similarly, one main objection to nave realism is the familiar charge that it implausibly allows for phenomenally indistinguishable experiences to differ in nature (pp.-).However, insofar as Papineau's strategy is to motivate the qualitative view by means of raising problems for competitor accounts, it is worth noting that these objections aren't particularly troublesome.Austere physicalists may have difficulty locating sense-data in the material world.But more liberal theorists, who allow for a wide range of derivative items that are grounded in the fundamental physical, would seem to have less trouble.Likewise, nave realists are happy to allow that sensory states can differ in nature even when such differences are not introspectable, and this commitment is far from incoherent.Accordingly, more needs to be said if these two views are to be set aside.Notably, therefore, Papineau also presses a version of the neglected time-lag argument against nave realists (pp.-).While no less historically important than the more familiar arguments from illusion and hallucination, the time-lag argument is rarely discussed by contemporary philosophers.However, it poses a deep challenge to the nave realist view.Suppose, for example, you look into the sky and

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