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Enregistrement W334517791

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997: The Case of Korea

2001· article· en· W334517791 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Suk H. Kim

Notice bibliographique

RevueMultinational Business Review · 2001
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueAsian Industrial and Economic Development
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésEconomicsFinancial crisisCurrent accountQuarter (Canadian coin)Real gross domestic productGross domestic productCurrencyShock (circulatory)Exchange rateEconomyInternational economicsMonetary economicsMacroeconomics
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

For three decades, Korea was held up as an economic icon. The country's typical blend of high savings and investment rates, autocratic political systems, export-oriented businesses, restricted domestic markets, government capital allocation, and controlled financial systems were hailed as ideal ingredients for the strong economic growth of developing countries (Shapiro, 1999). However, in July 1997, a currency turmoil erupted in Thailand, spreading to Korea and other countries. This article investigates a number of practical issues about the Korean crisis of 1997--interlinked economies, the causes of the crisis, and policy responses. The Korean Economy Before The Crisis Prior to the crisis, the Korean economy was characterized by a dichotomy between a strong real economy and a growing financial problem. In 1996, Korea had experienced a severe trade shock and a cutback in business investment following a boom in the early 1990s. These forces had reduced GDP growth from an annual rate of 9 percent in 1994-95 to 7 percent in 1996. The first quarter of 1997, when GDP growth fell to 5.7 percent, appeared to mark a successful soft landing (OECD, 1998). Although domestic demand was weak, GDP still grew 6 percent during the first three quarters of 1997. Other macroeconomic statistics, such as inflation (4.3 percent) and unemployment (2.3 percent) were low by Korean historical standard as well as OECD standards. At the same time, the current account deficit, which had soared to $23 billion in 1996, had been cut in half by the third quarter of 1997. Thus, many analysts concluded that the economy was firmly underpinned by cautious monetary and fiscal policies. An Economic Crisis in Thailand Spread Throughout the World International capital flows caused booms and busts for Thailand's economy. How could an economic crisis in an emerging economy, such as Thailand's, could spread throughout the world. Thailand's economy surged until early 1997 partly because the Thais found they could borrow dollars at low interest rates overseas more cheaply than they could the baht at home. By late 1996, foreign investors began to move their money out of Thailand because they worried about Thais' ability to repay. In February 1997, foreign investors and Thai companies rushed to convert their baht to dollars. The Thai central bank responded by buying baht with its dollar reserves and raising interest rates. The rise in interest rates drove prices for stocks and land downward. This dynamic situation drew attention to serious problems in the Thai economy: a huge foreign debt, trade deficits, and a banking system weakened by the heavy burden of unpaid loans. The Thai central bank ran out of dollars to support the baht. On July 2, 1997, the central bank stopped to defend the baht's fixed value against the dollar. And then the currency lost 16 percent of its value in one day. Investors and companies in the Philippine, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea realized that these economies shared all of Thailand's problems. So, investors and companies rushed to convert local currencies into dollars. And then, the peso, ringgit, rupiah, and won toppled in value like dominos in a row. In the fourth quarter of 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) arranged emergency rescue packages of $18 billion for Thailand, $43 billion for Indonesia, and $58 billion for Korea. By the end of 1998, the Asian crisis of 1997 spread to Russia, Brazil, and many other countries. Again, the IMF arranged bail-out packages of $23 billion for Russia in July 1998 and $42 for Brazil in November 1998. This means that since mid-summer 1997, IMF-led rescue packages for Asia, Russia, and Brazil racked up some $184 billion to keep world markets safe. In theory, capital is a boon, enabling developing countries to reduce poverty and raise living standards. But the theory does not always work smoothly. Countries mismanage the inflows. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,002
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,001
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: Empirique
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,039
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,077

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0020,001
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0010,003
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0040,003
Communication savante0,0070,005
Science ouverte0,0010,004
Intégrité de la recherche0,0030,003
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0030,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,044
Tête enseignante GPT0,314
Écart entre enseignants0,270 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations6
Publié2001
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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