Notice bibliographique
Résumé
INTRODUCTIONThere is a common view among critics of secular liberalism that liberal neutrality - for all its claims to be neutral towards - is itself a religion, albeit one without God. This common view, however, begs the central question: What do we mean by a religion in the first place? In his posthumously published Religion Without God, the liberal legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin squarely addresses the crucial question of what, for legal and political purposes, we should understand to be.2For Dworkin, traditional theistic beliefs are just one subset of morally respectable beliefs.3 Atheists - like those with traditional theistic beliefs - also hold comprehensive of what is of value in and about human life; we can meaningfully talk of an atheist religion.4 If we accept this nontheistic interpretation of - as any conviction concerning the meaning and importance of human life - we can interpret freedom of as protecting the right of each to live in accordance with their her conception of the life well lived. For Dworkin, freedom of follows from the key liberal value of ethical independence.5It is easy to see how, within the contemporary U.S. context, the theme of without God has proven compelling to liberals such as Dworkin. The Culture Wars have pitted religious conservatives against supposedly nonreligious liberals, whose defense of abortion, stem cells research, gay rights and the nonestablishment of the state is perceived as directed against majority Christian religious beliefs - even against religion itself. Dworkin provides liberals with a formidable rhetorical weapon. In his view, liberals have as strong a commitment to freedom of as conservatives, but they take freedom of to protect all ethical views about how to live life well, with dignity and self-respect. The right of homosexuals to marry and the right of women to have an abortion can now, on Dworkin's deliberately provocative theory, be defended in the name of freedom of itself.6I am interested in Religion Without God because it fits neatly into a broader set of new theories about liberalism and religion, which I elsewhere call theories of religious freedom.7 Such theories make three connected claims: (i) what we conventionally call should be seen a subset of a broader category of morally respectable beliefs and practices; (ii) traditional believers do not have a special, a priori right to be exempted from general laws; and (iii) the state must guarantee the equal status of all citizens.8 Let me simply mention two other recent and influential egalitarian theories of religious freedom.The first is Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager's Religious Freedom and the Constitution. Eisgruber and Sager interpret the Religion Clauses as not providing for special and unique legal treatment for above and beyond that granted to comparable and practices.9 The second is Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure's short piece drawing on the reasonable accommodations debate in Quebec, entitled Secularism and Freedom of Conscience.10 Taylor and Maclure argue that individuals with conscientious meaning-giving commitments should be considered for exemption from burdensome laws on the same basis as traditional religious believers.11 Egalitarian theories of religious freedom are intuitively attractive: they analogize freedom of with other liberal freedoms; they are rooted in the value of equality and nondiscrimination; and instead of denying protection to religious beliefs and practices they extend protection to secular conceptions of the good, to use John Rawls's phrase.12For all of their merits, however, I am skeptical that existing theories have succeeded in their main ambition - namely, to demonstrate that (what we traditionally mean by) can be unproblematically analogized with, or extended to, other kinds of practices and beliefs. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».