Why Different Powers Behave Similarly: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to American and Canadian Engagements in Afghanistan 2001-14

Over twenty years passed since American and Canadian forces arrived in Afghanistan to start the War on Terrorism as a response to 9/11, and during this period, there has been an enormous controversy about the nature and the scope of the Afghanistan intervention.Amidst this controversy, this dissertation aims to unravel a strategic puzzle: why and how the United States and Canada adopted similar engagement levels, especially similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies between 2005/2006 and 2011.During this time, the United States and Canada fought against insurgent groups, sought to maintain stabilized areas by mentoring Afghan forces, and invested in infrastructure and governance.These goals, which corresponded to the 'clear,' 'hold,' and 'build' COIN components, entailed sending troops and civilian officials to a war zone and committing financial resources.According to structural realism as a dominant IR theory, the similarity of American and Canadian engagements constitutes a puzzle because this theory would expect that countries with different relative standings in the international system are meant to adopt different foreign and security policies.To unravel this puzzle, this dissertation uses neoclassical realism.Like a realist theory, it examines the effects of relative material capabilities on foreign policy, which is an essential factor in comparing American and Canadian foreign and security policies.Yet, unlike structural realism, it considers dimensions other than states' relative standing, such as perceptions and domestic politics, which, along with the relative standing, help to unpack the puzzle above.Based on this theory, the central argument of this dissertation is that the similarity of American and Canadian engagements resulted from similar systemic stimuli from the post-9/11 strategic environment, foreign policy executives' (FPE) similar strategic beliefs, and comparable abilities to mobilize domestic resources.By showing the occurrence of factors on both American and Canadian sides bringing about the outcome above, this dissertation seeks to undermine the ideas of the "Americanization" of Canadian foreign and security policy and the syndrome of "parochialism" of the United States regarding its Northern neighbour.I want to begin by thanking the Departments of Political Science at Rosario and Carleton Universities in Colombia and Canada.The Department of Political Science at Rosario University believed in me by financing part of my doctoral studies and offering me a job as an assistant professor after finishing my Ph.D. Doing my BA and MA at Rosario also allowed me to get the required skills to succeed in a Ph.D. program of high standard.I thank my professors in Colombia, especially Dean Eduardo Barajas, for teaching me to navigate the world before entering it.For its part, Carleton University provided a magnificent space to develop my dissertation.Even though I started to study American and Canadian foreign policies long before initiating my Ph.D., the Department of Political Science was where I could sophisticate the puzzle of my research.In Loeb Building, sixth floor, I found insights that helped me give form to this puzzle and solve it.My core courses' instructors on International Relations and Comparative Politics drove me to follow enticing ways of thinking to compare the United States and Canada's roles in the world.Similarly, most of the arguments that I developed about NATO in this dissertation were informed by the course on Transatlantic Security Issues.I thank professors Brian Schmidt, Fiona Robinson, Jeremy Paltiel, Laura Macdonald, and Elinor Sloan for teaching these courses in a rigorous and enticing way. List of Graphs, Figures, Tables, and MapsGraphs Graph 1.1: Convergence between the United States and Canada during the Afghanistan intervention (2001-2014)…………………………………………………………………….….19 Graph 1.2: American and Canadian foreign and security policies: operationalization of variables……………………………………………………………….….50 Graph 2.1: Rationality spectrum and approaches to foreign and security policy……………….65Graph 6.1: Theories of foreign policy's levels of parsimony/thorough explanation and rationality refinement……………………………………………………………..………..297 Graph 6.2: Process-tracing resulting in COIN strategies…………………………….………...310 Graph 6.3: Puzzles for comparative foreign policy analyses within realist theorizing…….….316 foreign-policy explanations, mainly those provided by neoclassical realism, constitute a solid ground to address it.The present study seeks to address the third theoretical puzzle as it attempts to explain the similarity of Canadian and American foreign and security policies during the Afghanistan intervention after the 9/11 attacks.That is to say, it aims to explain why two states differently placed in the international system behaved similarly.It is worth noting that, during the Cold War, the United States and Canada undertook different foreign and security policies based in part on their ostensibly dissimilar power positions.Specifically, the United States, as a great power, carried out containment, deterrence, and counterinsurgency, which entailed long-term efforts and massive mobilization of resources.For its part, Canada, as a middle power, undertook peace-keeping operations, which often implied short-term efforts and logistical restrictions on already limited military capabilities.3 To be sure, such differences would correspond to the predictions of structural realism, especially for the first puzzle derived from Waltz's original goal.Since the United States managed to hold a top-rank position within the international system by excelling in all state capability components, it was willing and able to project its power globally and shape the international order.4 For its part, Canada placed in a middle rank between the top-tier powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, but also the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and probably China, and the small states.5 Based on this structural condition, Canada developed a relatively 3 On the United States, see George Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950

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