Index

Citation (2017), "Index", The Economics of Airport Operations (Advances in Airline Economics, Vol. 6), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 425-441. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2212-160920170000006016 Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited Copyright © 2017 Emerald Publishing Limited INDEX Additional flying time, 391 Aena, 5, 72, 76, 81–82 Aena Aeropuertos, 76 “Aerotropolis” policy, 252 Agglomeration, 244, 252 endogenization, 252 equilibrium, 246 partial, 248 pressures, 242 self-reinforcing, 236 shadow, 237 Aggregate airport effects baseline OLS estimates of, 278 DD estimation of standard errors and, 278–279 Agreements, 100, 108–109 bilateral, 370 cooperative, 150 master use-and-lease, 102 Open Skies, 389 Air accessibility, 265 Air Commerce Act (1926), 269–270, 272 Air Mail Network (1938), 271, 277 Air Mail system, 270 Air Passenger Duty, 214 Air Passenger Tax, 214–215 Air service incentive programs (ASIPs), 108–109 Air throughput unit (ATU), 159 Air traffic movements (ATM), 7, 153, 154, 159, 162, 168, 214, 217 Air transport parlance, 242, 243 Air Transport Research Society (ATRS), 105 airport benchmarking report, 105 Air Travel Tax, 214 Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 151n2 Airlines (AL), 20–21, 99, 130, 143 airline–airport relationship, 125 airports issue revenue bonds backed by, 104–105 behavior, 247 consequences for airline companies, 168 context, 240–241 control and/or invest in airport facilities, 102–103 impact of delays on airline frequencies, 338 economics, 50 models for, 216–220 network structure, 338 data, 343–349 empirical model, 349–351 estimation and results, 351–356 literature review, 337–339 model and equilibrium analysis, 339–343 network airlines, 335–336 policy implications, 356–357 organization, 367–368 ownership and joint decision of airport and, 107 residual RATE-setting method and signatory airline status, 101–102 revenue and risk sharing between airports and, 105 sector, 99 Airport charges (AC), 158–159, 165, 166, 214 Air Passenger Tax, 214–215 model results, 227–229 models for airlines and airports behavior, 216 airlines response to, 216–218 airport charging under different objectives, 218–220 numerical example, 230–231 pass–on rates under different market characteristics, 220–227 Airport Corporate Centre, 329 Airport Direct Travel (ADT), 53–54 Airport Employment Zone (AEZ), 323, 327 Airport Improvement Program (AIP), 104 Airport of Naples (NAP), 375 Airport–airline Airports Council International, 99–100 alternative forms, 101 airlines control and/or invest in airport facilities, 102–103 airport–airline consortium, 105–106 airports issue revenue bonds backed by airlines, 104–105 incentive programs and agreements, 108–109 information sharing and joint marketing, 107–108 long-term usage contract, 103–104 ownership and joint decision of airport and airline, 107 residual RATE-setting method and signatory airline status, 101–102 revenue and risk sharing between airports and airlines, 105 analytical approaches, 109 bargaining game, 112 case studies, 113 collusion or joint venture, 112–113 contract design and moral hazard, 113 driving times between English/Welsh airports, 110 interpretation of findings and implications, 114–116 revenue sharing, 111 study approaches, 113–114 arrangements, 6, 98 consortium, 105–106 cooperations, 99 relationship, 123 airport and airline risk sharing contract, 127–135 airport and airline vertical relationship, 124–127 balance of airport and airline risk sharing, 135–141 incomplete contract framework analysis, 141–149 revenue sharing, 111 Airports (AP), 1, 98–99, 127, 130, 143, 214, 236, 262 behavior, 216–220 business, 125 changing nature of airport operations and government role, 3–7 commercialization, 5 complex and risky business, 124–125 concessions two-side complementarity, 51 two-sidedness in, 51–55, 60–62 welfare neutrality, 51 welfare neutrality in airport concessions, 55–59, 60–62 congestion, 338 data, 343–349 empirical model, 349–351 estimation and results, 351–356 literature review, 337–339 model and equilibrium analysis, 339–343 network airlines, 335–336 policy implications, 356–357 connectivity quality, 411 average connecting times, 413 average travel distances and times of connecting passengers, 414 distribution of connecting times, 415 DTI, 417 hourly distribution of connecting passengers, 416 KPIs, 412 Middle East hubs, 411 cost structure, 8, 183 input measurement in airport industry, 185, 188–189, 210–212 output measurement in airport industry, 185–188, 210–212 policy implications, 203–204 scale and scope economies in airport industry, 196–203 technology of multiproduct firms, 189–196 deregulation, 70 economics literature, 51 effects on local and regional economies, 9–10 efficiency, structure and pricing of airport services, 7–9 efficiency plan, 76 finance, 74–75 identification with “significant impact”, 289 characteristics of “successful” airports, 295 comparison of samples: dependent variable, 290 geographic distribution of significant airports, 293 on local economies, 291 regressions, 294–297 synthetic control estimator, 289–292 tourism, 292–294 income from, 154 infrastructure, 154 investments, 116 issue revenue bonds backed by airlines, 104–105 LCCs and, 364 airline organization, 367–368 in catchment area, 366–367 deregulated environment, 365 power relations, 368–369 “light-handed” regulation, 2 local labor markets and, 267–269 location, 269 operations and connectivity, 10–12 ownership and joint decision of airport and airline, 107 pricing, 59 privatization, 70 quality, 52 revenue and risk sharing between airports and airlines, 105 risk sharing across industries, 125–127 services charges determination, 101–102 regulation of, 19–21 spatial evolution, 235 aviation, 236–237 conceptual framework of NGE, 238–244 critique of NGE approach, 253–255 implications for airport economics and policy, 249–253 model outcomes, 244–249 NGE, 237–238 traditional approaches to economic regulation of, 21 governance arrangements involving checks and balances, 23–24 price cap regulation, 22–23 rate of return regulation and cost-based regulation, 22 variations to direct regulatory approaches, 23 Airports Authorities Act (AAA), 25, 28 Airports Council International, 99–100 All Nippon Airways (ANA), 6, 129 airline, 140 All Nippon Airways-Noto arrangement, 6 group, 130, 134 Allocative inefficiencies, 79–80 additional robustness estimation, 95 airport privatization, 70 econometric specification and data, 80–83 through error component approach, 91 estimation, 69, 77 methodology distance function, 76–78 error component approach, 79–80 parametric approach, 78–79 through parametric approach, 86–90 results allocative inefficiency through error component approach, 91 allocative inefficiency through parametric approach, 86–90 input-oriented distance function, 83–86 Spanish airport system, 72–76 stochastic frontier approach, 71 Amenity scale, 292, 308–310 exception, 294 USDA ERS, 292 American Air Mail Catalogue , 270 “Archetypical” LCC business model, 393 Army Air Service (AAS), 270, 272, 273, 275 Auckland Airport, 28, 37, 38 Austin-Bergstrom Airport (AUS Airport), 294 Australia comparison of light-handed approaches to regulation of airport services in, 31 information disclosure and price and quality of service monitoring regulation, 31–32 key characteristics/features, 33 negotiate-arbitrate regulation, 32 reviews, 32–35 light-handed regulation of airports in, 26–27 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), 26, 100 Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average Model (ARIMA Model), 137–138 Aviation, 54, 247, 262, 265 activities, 50 aviation-dependent property, 10 businesses, 55–56 competition, 12 Avinor, 7, 164 charging policy, 158 consequences for Airport owner, 164, 167, 178–179 Norwegian airports owned by, 157 “Backyard capitalism”, 238, 250 Banking and finance sector, 317 Bargaining game, 112 Bartik instrument, 266 Baseline OLS estimates of aggregate airport effects, 278 Benchmarking worldwide airport connectivity with demand data, 387 data and methodology, 395 connectivity indicators, 398–402 datasets and methodology, 402–404 simplified regional air transport network, 396 “hub” airports, 388 literature review, 390 connectivity measures, 390–392 deregulation, airport competition and rise of new players, 392–393 self-connectivity, 393–395 Middle East carriers, 389 results and discussion airport connectivity quality, 411–417 evolution of global hub connectivity, 404–411 hidden potential of self-connectivity, 417–419 Bertrand competition, 226 Best weekly connection itineraries, 395 times, 401 Better Choice for Parking (BCP), 62 Bottasso, Anna, 7, 8, 181 British Midland International (BMI), 215 Build-own-transfer contract (BOT contract), 102–103 Cairo International Airport, 56 Capital stock measurement, 188 Capital variable, 82, 197 Car rental-type services, 57, 60, 61 Catchment area, 11, 365, 382 airports in, 366–367 analysis, 253 of Berlin, 193 international, 322 overlapping, 109 Census Based Statistical Area (CBSA), 269, 274–276, 287 Centralized management model, 71, 72, 76 Ceteris paribus, 243, 317 Charleroi airport, 108, 117 Circuity time. See Additional flying time Circular cumulative causation, 239 Civic amenity, 56 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 249 Clear Communications, 27 Cobb-Douglas function, 85, 246 Collusion, 112–113, 116 Colorado Springs Airport (COS Airport), 294, 297 Commerce Act (1986), 25, 28, 32, 36 Commerce Amendment Act (2008), 28 Commercial aviation, 270, 272, 274 Commercial property, 323 economic effect of airport operations, 315–318 international airport effect on commercial property values, 313 Toronto Pearson International Airport, 322–330 Vancouver International Airport, 318–322 Commercial services, 54, 63, 105, 107, 111, 114, 184 Commission for Aviation Regulation in Ireland, 30 Complementarity between aviation and commercial services, 54 one-side, 52 two-side, 51 Composite cost function, general specification of, 193–194 Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), 375, 377 Concession(s), 50–51, 52 services, 57 substitutability between concession goods at airport and goods, 55–57 traveler and non-traveler surplus in concessions consumption, 57–59 Congestion, 336 internalization of, 337 negative effects of, 338 Connecting time, 391, 399 Connecting Time Increase indicator (CTI indicator), 399–401, 413 Connectivity indicators, 398 average market length of transfer passengers, 401 passenger itineraries, 400 quality, 398–401 quantity, 398 SC potential indicator, 401–402 measures, 390–392 See also Global hub connectivity Constant-elasticity of substitution (CES), 246 Contract design, 113 Contract theory framework, 125 incomplete, 141–142 Copenhagen airport, 18, 20 Core-periphery dualism, 238 model, 243 vertical linkage model, 245 Cost complementarity test, 197, 202 Cost functions for UK airport industry, 198 Cost of raising public funds, 155, 166, 167, 229 Cost structure of airport industry input measurement in airport industry, 185, 188–189, 210–212 output measurement in airport industry, 185–188, 210–212 policy implications, 203–204 scale and scope economies in airport industry, 196–203 technology of multiproduct firms, 189–196 Cost-based regulation, 22 Cross-country studies, 199–201 Cross-sectional analysis, 326 hotels, 326–327 offices, 328–330 warehouses, 327–328 Customer facility charges (CFCs), 104 Dalian airport, 108 Data, 81–83, 343–349 Data envelopment analysis (DEA), 8, 28, 71, 183 Datasets, 303, 390, 402–404 Degree of airport/airline dependency, 369–371 Delays, 336 impact of delays on airline frequencies, 338 evolution of airport, 348 and size of airports in sample, 346 Demand demand-based approach, 391 endogenous location of, 243–244 functions, 221 DEN Consortium, 106 Destinations served (DEST), 292, 398 Detour Time Increase (DTI), 399, 400, 417 Detroit Airlines North Terminal Consortium (DANTeC), 106 Difference-in-differences (DD), 266 estimation of aggregate airport effects and standard errors, 278–279 estimator, 278 regression, 287 Direct passengers, 338, 396, 397 Direct regulatory approaches, 18, 21–22, 23, 42 Dispute resolution approach, 38–39, 41 to regulation, 42 Distance function, 76–78, 80 duality, 77 input-oriented, 71 output input, 199 Dixit-Stiglitz, 240, 246 Donor pool, 282, 294 Driving distance, 324, 326–327 Dubai, 12, 107, 112, 247, 401, 406, 407, 411, 413, 419 Dummy variables, 85, 161, 269, 305, 320, 350, 351 Duopoly, 8, 111, 215, 225–227, 337 Düsseldorf airport, 18 Dynamic oligopolistic market structure, 241 Earnings sharing regulation, 23 E-commerce, 53–54 Econometric specification, 80 Economic geography, 239, 253, 254 principles of economic welfare, 179–180 theory, 78 Economies of capacity utilization, 195–197 Elmira-Corning Regional Airport (ELM Airport), 283–287 Empirical model, 349–351 Endogenous firm locations, 242–243 location of demand, 243–244 Enhanced information disclosure regulation, 42 Equilibrium analysis, 339 comparison of frequencies and profits, 341–343 FC network, 339–341 HS network, 341 frequency, 341 model, 245–246 Error component approach, 79–80 allocative inefficiency through, 91 Estimation strategies, 278 baseline OLS estimates of aggregate airport effects, 278 DD estimation of aggregate airport effects and standard errors, 278 synthetic control analysis, 279–283 EU Airport Charges Directive, 18, 108 Euromonitor International, 56 Europe, LCCs in, 363–364 European Commission, 108–109 European Economic Area (EEA), 402 European hubs, 393, 407 European section of Airports Council, 317 Expected schedule delay, 340 Exponential demand function, 221, 224–225, 229 Federal actors, 270 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 100, 104, 105, 108–109, 274, 346 Feedback effect, 253 “First nature causes” of regional economic activity, 9 Fiscal fee, 215 Flight connectivity, 391 Food and beverage-type services, 57, 60, 61 “Foreclosure”, 114, 124 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 316 Forward Sortation Area (FSA), 325, 327 Freight (FRT), 159 Full service airlines (FSAs), 99, 103, 388 Fully connected networks (FC networks), 336, 337, 339–341 Gatwick Airport, 18 Gauging balance, 138–141 Gauging risk sharing balance framework, 135–137 General Airport Revenue Bonds (GARBs), 104 General obligation bonds (GO Bonds), 104 Geographical economics theory, 243 market, 391 Geography, Climate, and Complementary Transportation Networks, 269 Global Distributions Systems (GDSs), 403 Global hub connectivity basic KPIs, 405 connecting shares for selection of hubs, 407, 408 evolution of, 404 selection of African and Middle East hubs, 410 selection of European hubs, 409 selection of hubs in terms of percentage of connecting passengers, 408 Worldwide Hubs, 406 See also Connectivity Global Scale economies, 190–191, 192, 196 “Gold-plating” of assets, 22 Governance arrangements involving checks and balances, 23–24 Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2 Government in Ireland, 18 Grant assurances, 23 Great Depression, 249 Gross Land Area (GLA), 320 Gulf-based carriers, 388, 392 Heathrow’s traffic data, 398 Heavy-handed regulations, 24–25 Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index (HHI concentration index), 346, 350 Heterogeneous impact of airports case studies, 283–287 conventional wisdom, 262–263 data, 269–272 estimating effect of airports on cities, 272 estimation strategies, 278–283 research design, 269–277 literature review, 264–267 local labor markets and airports, 267–269 negative causal effects, 264 research design, 263 results, 287 airports identification with “significant impact”, 289–297 consistency of synthetic control estimator, 287–289 Hidden potential, 401, 402 of self-connectivity, 417–419 Hold-up problem, 142, 143 Hub airports, 388 connectivity, 391 premium, 99 Hub-and-spoke (HS), 336, 337 carriers, 367 network, 341 Hybridization, 393 “Iceberg” function, 241 Identification approach, 266 Imperfect competition, 240–241 Incentive programs, 108–109 Incentive regulation, 17, 22 Incomplete contract framework analysis incomplete contract theory and application to risk sharing contracts, 141–142 model, 142–145 numerical illustrations, 145–149 theory, 141–142 Indirect passengers, 396, 397 Information disclosure regulation, 31–32, 42 regulatory compliance costs of alternative approaches, 39 threat of stronger regulatory measure, or regulatory intervention, light-handed regulation, 36 transparency of airport performance under light-handed regulation, 37–38 Information sharing, 107–108 Input distance function, 77 Input measurement in airport industry, 185, 188–189, 210–212 Input methodologies, 28, 37 Input-oriented distance function, 77–78, 83 estimates of distance frontier system, 84 ‘models’ test, 85 parametric approach, 86 Instrumental variables approach, 266 Inter-LCC connectivity, 395 Internalization of congestion, 337 hypothesis states, 337 International air transport, 10 hub cities, 236 organizations, 154 International Air Transport Association (IATA), 99–100, 108, 154, 214 International airport effect on commercial property values economic effect of airport operations, 315–318 Toronto Pearson International Airport, 322–330 Vancouver International Airport, 318–322 International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), 103, 154, 214 Interpretation of findings and implications, 114–116 Intra-LCC connectivity, 395 IPUMS database, 269 Istanbul, 406 Joint marketing, 107–108 Joint venture, 112–113, 131, 135, 142 Karlsruhe (FKB), 381 Labor demand, 267 Lack of motivation, 76–77 Lagrangian function, 219 “Leave-one-out” method, 283 Light-handed regulation, 2, 3, 7, 15, 16, 29, 100 airport services in Australia and New Zealand, 31 information disclosure and price and quality of service monitoring regulation, 31–32 key characteristics/features, 33 negotiate-arbitrate regulation, 32 reviews, 32–35 benefits of greater negotiation of airport services, 30–31 design, 35–41 difficulties experienced with price cap regulation of airport services, 29 increased complexity and regulatory intervention over time, 29–30 risk and uncertainty, 30 direct regulatory approaches, 18 evolution, 24 Australia, 26–27 New Zealand, 24–25, 27–29 North America, 25–26 “light-handed” regulatory alternative, 16 price cap regulation, 17 regulation of airport services, 19–21 regulatory compliance costs of alternative approaches, 39 information disclosure regulation and price and quality, 39 negotiate-arbitrate regulation, 39 threat of stronger regulatory measure, or regulatory intervention, under, 35 information disclosure regulation and price and quality, 36 negotiate-arbitrate regulation, 36–37 traditional approaches to economic regulation of airports, 21–24 transparency of airport performance under light-handed regulation, 37 information disclosure regulation and price and quality, 37–38 negotiate-arbitrate regulation, 38–39 Linear demand function, 221–223 duopoly, 225–227 Load 130, Load 105, 127, Airport, 140 economies, airport effects 9–10 labor markets and airports, 267–269 theory, 20 417 107, 215, 393, 396, 407, 411, 413, 416 airports, global economies of scale, 196 cost pricing, for airline and passengers, 168 for airport owner, consequences of, price to, for welfare usage contract, 6, 106 324, 327 effect, 241 cost 11, 99, 336, 389 and airports, 364 airline organization, 367–368 in catchment area, 366–367 deregulated environment, 365 power relations, 368–369 analysis case studies, methodology, and case of airport/airline dependency, 369–371 in Europe, 363–364 of model, in 364 for airport sample, service 113 Airport in 102 costs 162, estimation in cost-based airport aviation charges on pricing, on pricing, consequences of cost pricing, consequences of pricing, 178–179 cost of raising public funds, to revenue price to pricing, 154 247 253 214 error 125 Middle East carriers, 393 hubs, 411 airports, airports, 389 approach, 32 data on passenger demand 391, 403 market structure, hazard, 113 Airport Systems firms, technology of, 189–196 Scale economies, Bargaining 143, Aviation 18 Board plan, Information 269 of Integrated Airport 23 236 regulation, 32, 42 light-handed regulation, 36–37 regulatory compliance costs of alternative approaches, 39 threat of stronger regulatory measure, or regulatory intervention, 36–37 transparency of airport 38–39 benefits of, 30–31 theory, method, Network airlines, 335–336 behavior, 339 337 New economic 236, 239, New economics 253 aviation, 236–237 conceptual framework of, 238 endogenous firm locations, 242–243 endogenous location of demand, 243–244 competition, 240–241 study of 239 critique of, 253–255 implications for airport economics and policy, 249 implications for and analysis of airport location problem, NGE to transport model outcomes, 244–249 New Zealand, 27 to light-handed regulation in, 27–29 comparison of light-handed approaches to regulation of airport services in, 31 information disclosure and price and quality of service monitoring regulation, 31–32 key characteristics/features, 33 negotiate-arbitrate regulation, 32 reviews, 32–35 light-handed regulation in, 24–25 New Commerce Commission 28, 35 International Airport 109 market, 393–395 135, 105 activities, 61 businesses, 55–56 property, 10 50 services, carriers, surplus in concessions consumption, 57–59 goods, North America, Regulation in in, 25–26 North American 322 Norwegian Airports costs pricing structure, Norwegian 159, 164, Norwegian of Transport and Communications, 155, 162, 164 airport, 142 information 129 group, airport long-term results, of Airport 134 contract, 85, 91 model, 135, 402 complementarity, 52 Open 151n2 287 measurement in airport industry, 185–188, 210–212 approach, 80 allocative inefficiency through, 86 evolution of allocative efficiency for of inefficiency by of 86 Spanish airport system, evolution efficiency consumption, evolution of allocative efficiency equilibrium, 339 demand function, demand, 221–223 duopoly, 225–227 under market characteristics, power demand function, airport Passenger facility charges 104 60, 154, 159, 214, 215, 219 airports 168 connectivity, 391 consequences for, 168 404 price travel demand, 247, 391 competition, 240–241 test, function, airlines, 339 367 data, 269 274 demand function, 221, relations, 368–369 71 See also Allocative efficiency estimation cap regulation, 22–23 difficulties experienced 29 increased complexity and regulatory intervention over time, 29–30 risk and uncertainty, 30 in 17 to See also Service price and quality of of airport operations airport consequences for pricing, 178–179 costs at Norwegian airports, cost-based airport Norwegian airport structure, principles of economic welfare, 179–180 pricing under airports, 365, theory, airports, airport, 70 airport schedule 76 by Spanish 5 of Airport, scale economies, Commission, 39 airports, airports, Service 375 connectivity indicators, 398–401 connectivity indicators, 398 pricing approach, 7, 214 under at Norwegian 154, Rate of return regulation, 22 Regional economies, effects 9–10 See also Scale and scope economies in airport industry 249 Regional 236 289 analysis, 320, 17 375 evolution of 377 for airport sample, 134 294 RATE-setting method, 101–102 Revenue airports issue revenue bonds backed by airlines, 104–105 revenue and risk sharing between airports and airlines, 105 sharing, 111 sharing airport and airline, information on airport, 129 airport balance of airport and airline framework of risk sharing balance, 135–137 balance, 138–141 model for risk sharing balance, 137–138 141–142 across industries, 125–127 relationship, 6 382 Airlines Consortium 106 Scale and scope economies in airport industry, 192, 196 studies, 199–201 studies, Airlines 168 and sector, 317 9 airport, 365, 12, 393–395 hidden potential of, 417–419 potential indicator, 401–402 236, 237 Service price and quality of in Australia, 38 information disclosure regulation and, 37, 39 regulation, 31–32 30 101–102 model, 216 Airlines 107 studies, 197, scale regulation, 23 welfare, 7, 166, 219 Spanish airport system, 71, of Spanish airports, passenger and of Spanish airports, Spanish airport Spanish of Spanish Statistical Office 81–82 265 evolution of airports aviation, 236–237 conceptual framework of NGE, 238–244 critique of NGE approach, 253–255 implications for airport economics and policy, 249–253 model outcomes, 244–249 NGE, 237–238 238 Revenue Bonds 104 Airport frontier approach, 71 241 264 See Gulf-based approaches, 391 Airport, control analysis, 279–283 control estimator, consistency of, 287–289 contract, 112 efficiency, 183 27 Act 28 Terminal 159 292 Time analysis, 265 248 Toronto Pearson International Airport 322 323 Toronto impact on commercial property values, analysis, 326 hotels, 326–327 offices, 328–330 warehouses, 327–328 time analysis, services, goods, 27 analysis, 411 396 367 and Air 270 Transport NGE to, Transportation Service 109 Travel time 398 surplus in concessions consumption, 57–59 cost function, complementarity, 52 in airport concessions, 51–55, 60–62 UK Civil Aviation 111, 215 UK Competition Commission, 111, 116 cost structure of airports, Time 402 of General 104 airports, airport, 381 Vancouver International Airport 318–322 See also Toronto Pearson International Airport 391 contracts, linkage model, 239, 244–249 100, 101 airport and airline, 124–127 113–114 327–328 airports, 219 neutrality, 51 in airport concessions, 60–62 substitutability between concession goods, 55–57 traveler and non-traveler surplus in concessions consumption, 57–59 159, 185, 217 evolution of 377 for airport sample, Regional Airport 109 2 Regulation of Airport to Direct and in Airport Estimation of Allocative in Airports for 5 of and 6 Airport and Airline of of Airport Operations The Cost of Airport and Empirical 9 Airport Charges between Airlines and Airports 10 of New Geographical Economics The Heterogeneous of Airports on and Employment Growth in 12 The of International Airports on Commercial of and Airport and Airline Network and Benchmarking Worldwide Airport Connectivity with Demand Global Hub New and Hidden of

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