Foro Internacional (special issue on Cuba). JulioñSeptiembre 2003, vol. XLIII, No. 3 (173) (review)

Reviewed by: Foro Internacional (special issue on Cuba). Julio-Septiembre 2003, vol. xliii, No. 3 (173) Laurence Whitehead Foro Internacional (special issue on Cuba). Julio–Septiembre 2003, vol. xliii, No. 3 (173). El Centro de Estudios Internacionales de El Colegio de México, 2003. This issue of the venerable quarterly journal of the Colegio de Mexico is devoted entirely to contemporary Cuba and in particular to the mounting pressures on the Castro regime that have recently arisen both internally and internationally. On the domestic side it covers the inadequacies of the economic system (Pérez-López); the nature of the challenge posed by the emerging dissident movement (Fernández); as well as how the rigidities of the political regime cloud the succession (Pérez-Stable). The international topics covered include the various aspects of the conflict with the United States (Falcoff, Kaufman Purcell, Roy, and a particularly interesting contribution by Portes on the Cuban Amercian political machine in Miami); together with Cuba's deteriorating relations with Canada (Warren); with Mexico (Covarrubias); and with international organizations (Heller). Domínguez offers a relatively upbeat comparative overview. This is a well-structured compilation of thoughtful essays by leading scholars, and it encompasses a diversity of viewpoints (although not including any defenders of the Castro regime). The papers were first presented at a conference in Colmex in March 2002, and although they have been updated they could not anticipate Havana's intensified isolation during 2003. Key relations with South America (especially the Venezuela of Chávez and Lula's [End Page 192] Brazil) are also missing, as are the repercussions of the Iraq war. It is the nature of such scholarly enterprises that they lag behind the pace of political events, especially in times of turbulence. The demise of the Castro regime has been predicted so long and so often that one must hesitate to conclude that this time the end really is nigh. Yet the patriarch had definitely reached late autumn. Whatever the endgame the long period since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc has already revealed or confirmed various idiosyncrasies that were partially masked from view by the ideological climate of the Cold War. Other communist regimes have proved more flexible in matters of economic reform. Other revolutionary movements have either evolved or disintegrated in the face of evidence contradicting their foundational myths. Other personalist rulers have sought to avert a succession crisis by creating usable institutions (i.e., procedural rules offering at least some space for participation by the "moderate" opposition). None of these alternative paths have found favor with the aging comandante. This volume provides a rich array of clues to help explain why not. But most of the essays approach this central question obliquely. Two major lines of explanation suggest themselves. In various ways the chapters on United States–Cuban relations all hint that the key to Cuba's deviant path may lie with the nationalist passions stirred by Havana's emotional defiance of Washington. But the chapters on Cuba's recent relations with Canada, Mexico, and the European Union raise a doubt over this. If the central problem has been U.S. unilateralism, then a weakened Cuban regime would logically be expected to build alliances with any independent-minded third parties capable of blunting American hostility. So why has Havana now fallen out with all these potential interlocutors? This points to an alternative explanation, which can be formulated either in terms of personalist intransigence or of ideological purity. (Although, after forty-five years of self-preservation as the embodiment of anti-imperialism, it may be fruitless to attempt to disentangle these two strands of Fidel's persona). The Castro regime may truly exemplify what recent British prime ministers have asserted about themselves ("I have no reverse gear," is Blair's latest restatement of Thatcher's "You turn if you want. This lady's not for turning"). As the full consequences of this implacable stance unfold, more evidence will accumulate that may help us decide between these alternative explanations. Arguably these two explanations are not true alternatives but, rather, mutually supportive facets of a single desencuentro. But whatever verdict accompanies the final emergence of a post-Castro political...

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