Interpreting Russell’s Paralysis

Interpreting Russell’s Paralysis Graham P. Stevens James R. Connelly. Wittgenstein’s Critique of Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement. London and New York: Anthem P., 2021. Pp. xiv, 206. (Hb) isbn-13: 978-1-78527-740-5, us$125; (ebook) 978-1-78527-741-2, us$40. In 1913 Russell reportedly told Wittgenstein that he was “paralyzed” by Wittgenstein’s objection to the multiple relation theory of judgment at the heart of the book he was writing. Russell abandoned the manuscript, which was only published after his death. However, no clear record of the objection, fully stated, has survived. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there are a lot of competing interpretations of Russell’s paralysis. Given the amount of coverage it has received, a book-length study of the issue is maybe not a hard thing to produce. A good book-length study which does justice to all of these competing theories through a careful analysis of them while also carving out space for a new contribution to that field is far harder to achieve. James Connelly has achieved that here. The multiple relation theory of judgment (mrtj) was intended to eliminate Russell’s ontology of propositions by replacing them with judgment complexes. Ontologically speaking, judgments are not self-subsisting entities but formations out of constituents that are the true members of Russell’s ontology. The proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio does not exist as a unified complex, but Desdemona, Cassio and the relation expressed by the verb “loves” do. Othello’s belief unites these entities through an act of judgment. Wittgenstein’s objection is commonly thought to be directed at demonstrating that judgment (at least as construed by Russell) is not a suitable relation for securing something that meets the demands we have of propositional content. The starting place for the competing interpretations is the ingenious account offered by Stephen Sommerville and Nicholas Griffin. What made their interpretation such an improvement on earlier proposals is that they were the first to really take seriously Russell’s dramatic response. Previous interpretations had provided compelling accounts of how Wittgenstein’s objection fitted into [End Page 181] his wider philosophical project in the Tractatus, but gave no explanation for why Russell should be particularly troubled by it. Sommerville–Griffin argued that the objection exposes a fundamental incompatibility between the mrtj and the ramified type theory of Principia Mathematica. Given that the mrtj was intended to play a key role in the same work, this interpretation gives a very good explanation for the impact of the objection on Russell if he was persuaded by it. Connelly recognizes the influence of the Sommerville–Griffin interpretation, labelling it “sr” (standard reading) and situating subsequent interpretations in comparison to it, including his own. The alternative accounts include my own, as well as those of Peter Hanks, Christopher Pincock, Gregory Landini, Samuel Lebens and Fraser MacBride, and other interpretations are often considered alongside these main targets of the book. An inevitable criticism one might be tempted raise at this point is that several other interpretations are excluded, at least from detailed scrutiny, although it is hard to see how any book on this topic could avoid that without becoming intolerably long. Connelly’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s objection divides it into three “waves”: (1) a general complaint that the Theory of Knowledge manuscript was mistakenly prioritizing epistemology over logic in trying to solve foundational questions; (2) the specific attack on the structure of judgments in the mrtj; (3) the appeal to logical forms in the theory. Really, (1) is something of a scene-setting device. As an objection it would be flimsy, as it just amounts to an opinion of Wittgenstein’s, not any sort of argument. But what makes it significant, Connelly suggests, is that Russell shared the same view, hence the force of the concern in his mind. While I agree with Connelly up to a point here, and he certainly provides evidence for the claim, I don’t think this issue can really point to an explanation of Russell’s paralysis. For one thing, the terms “logic” and “theory of knowledge” are being used in quite an antiquated sense by Russell and Wittgenstein: much...

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