Michael L. Raposa Plays with Peirce, Love, and Signs: Review Essay on <i>Theosemiotic: Religion, Reading, and the Gift of Meaning</i>

Those of us who are convinced that Charles Peirce had something important to say, not just about the practice of scientific inquiry, metaphysics, and semiotics, but about how best to navigate an evolving and often precarious universe, sometimes find ourselves struggling with his infelicitous overstatements and rhetorical missteps. Brilliant but cantankerous, his personal and professional frustrations often bleed over into his writings. If this is a pardonable sin, and I think it is, then we should note those places where Peirce acknowledged the occasional coarseness of his prose. He was, “a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what [he called] semiotic [ . . . ] and [he found] the field too vast, the labor too great for a first-comer.”1 So it is no surprise that Peirce wrote something of a disclaimer into How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878), in reference to his essay from only a few months earlier, The Fixation of Belief (1877). In arguing in that earlier essay that “the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained; so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought,” he had used language “too strong” for his purposes. It was, he suggests, as if he “had described the phenomena as they appear under a mental microscope.”2 Peirce's early and most famous essays are remarkably insightful and, while his aperture was often too narrow, they both opened sufficient ground for him to develop his mature philosophy of inquiry and blazed a broad enough trail for future scholars to follow.It may seem odd to open a review of Michael L. Raposa's Theosemiotic: Religion, Reading, and the Gift of Meaning with a cautionary note on Peirce's writing style, but it highlights the degree to which Raposa has accomplished something remarkable; he has done what the early Peirce suggested could not be done.3 He has identified an additional function of thought, “something more than doubt's removal, much more than the fixation of belief,” and attentively developed a technique of playful musement.4 Beginning with only the merest “outline” offered by Peirce in A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (1908), Raposa rereads works from, most notably, Ignatius of Loyola, Jonathan Edwards, Josiah Royce, and Simone Weil in order to reread Peirce's semiotics and his philosophy of inquiry. While Raposa's Peirce's Philosophy of Religion (1988), his most well-known and often cited book, is a careful exposition of Peirce's writings on religion, Theosemiotic is something less and something much more.5 There is very little line by line analysis of Peirce's writings and Raposa makes no claim to offer readers a canonical interpretation. Rather, it is the act of rereading Peirce, most especially his A Neglected Argument, that is central to Theosemiotic and is intended to serve as an exercise in habituation.Peirce's claim in Fixation of Belief to have identified the sole purpose of thought is overstated, and it is more than just a bit amusing that, in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, even as he attempts to soften his position with a musical simile, and allow room for considering other incidental results of thought, he cannot help but insult those who might find other purposes.6 Whether or not Raposa feels the sting of Peirce's barbed words, I do not know, but contra the early Peirce's portrayal, there is nothing debauched or perverted in the program laid out in Theosemiotic. Indeed, Raposa takes the act of thinking (always thinking with signs) at least as seriously as Peirce, and likely more so than the early Peirce in at least one respect. Playful thought, thought without serious or antecedent purpose, thought as musement or even amusement can be richly rewarding form of engagement that trains the muser, over many years and through long practice, to receive what the universe has to give. The notion that playful musement is important but not serious, and that it is a skill that can be cultivated resonates with the Daoist tradition that Raposa also brings into conversation with his theosemiotic. However, one should not overlook the dissonance that lurks at the heart of the claim that theosemiotic is a matter of vital importance, even as it requires “Pure Play” and “has no rules.”7 Luckily Theosemiotic is crafted more to evoke than to describe the habits of habit formation that musement entails. Musement cannot be serious, but throughout the text Raposa shows the religious import of learning to think playfully.I have three aims in this brief review essay. First, I situate Theosemiotic within Raposa's larger body of work. Second, I locate what I take to be the central contribution of his text, an extended articulation of musement as a form of experimental inquiry and therapy that is defensible in its own right, not just as a preparatory stage of scientific probation. Finally, I circle back to what I believe to be a serious flaw in Peirce's writings on musement and God and argue that, despite my disagreement with both Peirce and Raposa on theism, Theosemioitc provides many of the tools necessary to see our way past anthropomorphism.Scholars of Peirce with an interest in religion have been anticipating Theosemiotic for at least three decades, ever since Raposa, in the final chapter of Peirce's Philosophy of Religion, hinted at the possibility of an expanded treatment. During this time there have been additional tantalizing hints and gestures toward a larger project,8 even as others have taken up the term and contributed their own reflections.9 As a final realization of a trajectory, Theosemiotic more than meets expectations. Here, however, I focus largely on the degree to which Raposa's book answers a nagging question that has often bothered me concerning Peirce's description of the God hypothesis.10 Granted, Peirce is careful to defend only a very narrowly conceived variety of anthropomorphism when he suggests that God is “vaguely like a man” and even more careful in A Neglected Argument to surround the God hypothesis with enough caveats and stipulations as to its vagueness that one is left to wonder if the hypothesis retains anything determinate enough that it might be subjected to rational inquiry.11 As an extraordinarily vague hypothesis, God would seem to be too vague to have any determinate conceivable practical effects. How does one go about interrogating such a supremely vague hypothesis?A deep dive into the earliest works from Raposa, especially a remarkably insightful article that predates his first book, yields one of the clearest articulations of this question.12 Though he does not yet use the term theosemiotic, there he formulates both the question and a set of three possible inquisitive strategies, the third of which would eventually give birth to Theosemiotic more than thirty years later. As I read this early piece, it is a kind of promissory note and it is worth our attention both because it so well situates Theosemiotic among other attempts to explore the God hypothesis and because it shows just how seriously Raposa has taken Peirce's philosophy of inquiry and Peirce's recommendation of a thoroughly scientific approach to all questions, even those involving religion.Peirce made strong claims about the indubitability of the exceptionally vague God hypothesis, but overstatements aside, Raposa focuses on an additional potential problem. “[O]wing to its obscurity or vagueness, it is virtually impossible to deduce the testable implications of the hypothesis.”13 Even if it were determinate enough to allow for deducible implications, one still faces the enormous challenge of beginning the inductive phase of inquiry and gathering evidence for the claim that God is real and has real effects. There are, Raposa notes, three possible ways forward. First, one might engage in the onerous tasks of scientific cosmology in the hopes of garnering sufficient evidence through careful study and observation and developing sophisticated enough techniques and theories that one might in the very distant future explicate the God hypothesis well enough that it becomes empirically testable. This would be one goal of scientific inquiry, though it is rarely (I will not say never) pursued with such explicitly theological aims. Second, “since the meaning of the idea of God is revealed in human conduct, a test of the reality of that being might consist in a long-range assessment of the fruitfulness, the success of behavior that conforms to this hypothesis as an ideal.”14 This would seem to offer a more promising program for theologians, though its final realization would need to be put off into the indefinite future.15 These are both live options for inquiring into the God hypothesis, but they both run aground or at least encounter serious frustrations when they come up against the indeterminate future. Such inquiries cannot be restricted to any bounded period of time without rendering the hypothesis more determinate than Peirce intends it to be. But here Raposa notes a third “more practical possibility,” and suggests that “Musement a kind of in when I first this article from Raposa and into his Peirce's Philosophy of Religion, this third not any It to me a of Peirce's the in a of three that A Neglected I to see though in my Raposa only the notion in was that musement might more than an of the Raposa to throughout Theosemiotic is the idea that, though playful musement might be most with the of it is not of of and “vaguely to The of rational inquiry is, in in musement in at least It is not too to that musement so long as it is in may a both the of more than three work on Peirce's religious thought and the of early Theosemiotic is most as it any of A Neglected Argument and to focus on be Raposa does not explicitly an but I to the of A Neglected Argument as an in of the of any God hypothesis, and that Raposa does as However, in the of Theosemiotic something much more a that the most and most rewarding inquiries need not be so serious, so on so and toward final as to inquiry of and and it If the God hypothesis is the with which inquiry work the with which inquiry is often to then it is not the final of that hypothesis that is in question but rather the of the that through such Peirce that we have habits and and a antecedent to any inquiry, but while the degree to which the of inquiry often habits and he was less to the degree to which the of the is in the It is this more that Raposa in and the potential for and religious an evolving universe through with and from well habits and may often But while may this to our of the universe by at it would be a to that only and scientific are Theosemiotic Raposa both the and variety of but notes that, despite their not all is Rather, is my this is the which the text the that Raposa to develop a notion of theosemiotic that well a of Peirce's Theosemiotic is but theosemiotic is more than It much and and then is in so much religious behavior is to this as a of the language and of and there are in Theosemiotic that appear at first to do just But Raposa is too careful and well in the of Peirce's philosophy of inquiry to such a a famous line from Peirce he is the very broad in which is also not to what at the of but all the way to the of is experimental when it is not in the that a has of engagement but in the that a can exercise of and from becomes experimental it is an a in which we not only from and of the universe but how to more and there is such a would not be may be because they and Jonathan notion of Raposa all of the notes that one might from a religious in the of Peirce and and in a early notes Peirce's of as a This the of the of for here we find Raposa's first that “the vagueness of religious and the extended or of what may be as religious the of assessment and and will do for in The meaning of any or any is a of the or of what Peirce sometimes a is it a of a or to that is an in and with other in the of It is the of meaning that assessment and and, I would and sometimes But religious and be taken so If such are as of and inductive then they are serious as they that have serious in the But what if this could be in if experimental inquiry not have to a beginning with the irritation of and with the of a habit of As Raposa Peirce about the of The first and more is in his essays from but a as from out of the of playful through the of this not all are so with and as to inquiry a serious and a as Raposa is a kind of playful serious but Peirce's that musement is both important and Raposa does more than for the of religious The of most is, to a of so that the or best one might be Even this is too serious a As an of the of such I to a from a text from the of Theosemiotic. The the description of the of playful he and his used to have long a practice that we for many Our was a in which we and our question was a and we out many in a were not seriously for the to the question we Our was to and the the first on that to the one we were to even when we it to be experimental laid the for serious on both and that was with the in However, as the were not with any serious purpose in were because they were playful and to the to see and that more serious and would have A at is not a for answers to questions, a to It is, as Raposa so often a open to what the universe has to of musement does not that it is not work. often go to It should not be with or becomes a without my Raposa in his Playful as to in his requires an of to what is to as of meaning or religious in the of one is still in one by and to of purpose would this and on toward and this is one Raposa and to the potential of in its he is a more of not something that only on an but a way in which one becomes to one to this or in this as a human our is we might is the and The Fixation of Belief and A Neglected Argument and is to note that Peirce's description of the that might inquiry There is, however, an important that should not be what he a can musement be as preparatory for [ . . . ] or for scientific Here, I is where Peirce's about the of to come for inquiry on both a that are are of our about as Peirce and a that and of a great still being is the practice that might best us to a of its a a of the question of the what is revealed in musement is the no less real than what is revealed through scientific inquiry. In and Peirce is on this the of musement through be into scientific But where to Peirce, “the one musement is to less thoroughly and more to engage in and to in other words, the of a universe with without for the more serious question of or not such be is a enough that others will than but the central that I take from Raposa's text is his observation that all the of scientific inquiry are in in other words, is a in which all three of inquiry and their as the in a the is but from a musement as an exercise for developing the that is for such an and this is as Raposa so from the of that for a what is in musement that it from scientific inquiry is the more of and the more to inductive the and of a hypothesis, its are But to scientific from musement would the is in musement is not a hypothesis but “the and this Raposa not only to on the work of Ignatius and Edwards, but to from an on developing habits of and interpretation. As a Raposa's take on the of but habits attention as well and are of experimental a like Peirce's claim that God is best conceived as “vaguely like a man” has been However, Raposa's careful on Peirce's of vagueness and anthropomorphism as they to this of the are in the of that I to in even as I and toward an central question both the and the of our I with with both the belief in a personal as well as being like Peirce and its all of Theosemiotic the of this of Raposa most the of vagueness, and in the third in a of from Peirce's Raposa becomes possible to argue that the of a not human The of or being in with the universe makes only if something personal can be at the heart of the only if Peirce a God into as the of the book of This is if and its are not as Peirce conceived of in essays such as Peirce not to but to not to we do not know, to of but to our own our and we is one we live not but in and There is an for Peirce, of and of by that the universe of being a of potential one might to any take it up as an of and to in its It is not by out to the circle of my that I can but by and as I would the in my The philosophy we from is that this is the way and as for the only so as it yet is and so has is it of of in the it into and makes it that here is the the This does not as Raposa notes, that is a a with as an something that does to Rather, through attention as like is so that it is the the that both to serve as for one to and to Raposa its be as a matter of a of what was into the of real so that is to a or but best as an habit of this would seem to a personal of careful anthropomorphism and the as while the as that human thinking will take a Peirce in that are to the of being virtually not the that such a form should be to other ways of of God from a of vagueness and and into and of determinate of what it to the of the universe as “vaguely like a While I that such a can long be the and of and playful it is to Raposa's that he faces this potential In many ways his third chapter an extended of anthropomorphism and the is well by his its I take his to a that are and in human and the that such anthropomorphism has in that have contributed to the success with which have so and about and even that is what much all are at just how or “vaguely like a man” can any of the and of the universe be without being that question the how much anthropomorphism can be from such a it becomes is something of a in theosemiotic. that is too becomes while any that is too personal becomes But this is the kind of that theosemiotic is well to it takes seriously enough the of not just the and but that which is and may be to only that which we as but this to be the kind of habit most in need most in need I with Raposa's that theosemiotic us from I not convinced by Peirce and Royce, and to a degree Raposa, that of or being in with the universe [ . . . ] makes only if something personal can be at the heart of the not this the habit of the of as the very kind of habit that theosemiotic might and the not also be of a with as a by a personal as at the of the one of the of playful musement is to allow habits to more are we not then in more serious, of inquiry, both to the of such habits and to their potential and Such more than playful of musement but need not musement and As Raposa in meaning is a of habit also habit as Peirce in the of any a matter of habit the theological being developed I to that the of a habit of is what any conceived as a should come to in not only to other but to the universe of could be less of less of than to and own toward or personal of the universe as the of theosemiotic. be Raposa does not this and in up a though less observation in the final of his third But Peirce does this and it worth that of Raposa's most careful to all the semiotic he can from Peirce's of vagueness without and a of may in to to a of the human toward Raposa notes that have a of theories involving “a to in have suggested that this was of our early and that this might our He this of our so as to it with Peirce's claim that there is an or human thought and a to both his and his as Raposa also notes, it is most especially Peirce's that suggests that is a for and Raposa's of throughout Theosemiotic is but he does not much the that does not or by or by These are only in if any of the three is taken as sufficient on its have that Peirce's something like the offered by as works with and other to when taken as to the of habits of and are not in do they offer of one for and other are not by are, as Peirce's on would by Whether we should the theories of or those offered by Peirce as the best of “the among of our to to not just the of the of that but the of I that Raposa and I However, the more important the more serious question the that habits have on and the time for musement has as it and we how best to the through do we the by it and its as of a personal or is this habit best left There is, so as I can no way to this question within the playful of musement and it is no that Raposa his text with the final then I Musement a long way toward us with a of and developing but and Peirce suggested early in his that “the production of belief is the sole function of thought,” he both the of belief in to and the of thought, the of playful interpretation. It would be if readers were to take my in the as a rather that one eventually put and engage in serious but this would be a There is nothing in a for can take in playful and, as Raposa so engage in musement as its own even as one a great about own the of the more serious inquiries that come it may be as a preparatory exercise and its most may be as too often but that does not musement less important or Indeed, as Peirce is the only of that can any idea It is a necessary of all the out of which but it is no that Raposa that playful musement is left for Theosemiotic is that is a in for the vital of and not only in on Peirce and but in all of inquiry where human and are Raposa focuses his on religious but there is much in this text that toward a Musement is preparatory for both and scientific inquiry. while I do not that serious scientific inquiry is often by religious like and there is also much to be by a few to reread to to on our habits of and to the of our of Whether or not personal and and and are ever at of vagueness is a question that can only be in the long In the and we have time to

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