An Arctic in Flux: Singapore's Perspective

An Arctic in Flux:Singapore's Perspective Hema Nadarajah (bio) Amid multiple global crises and conflicts, the often-cited concept of Arctic exceptionalism—the unique governance that has facilitated cooperation in the region—has come under strain.1 A series of overlapping and multilayered geopolitical issues present challenges to Arctic governance, which is often assumed to be resistant to conflict elsewhere, and to cooperation, the "norm" of the region. From escalating tensions between the United States and China to Russia's invasion of Ukraine to the ever-accelerating climate crisis, the Arctic is undeniably at a point of inflection. With the Arctic Council's activities currently paused due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, concerns over the role of the council's observer states, including Asian states Singapore, China, Japan, South Korea, and India, have been raised. However, despite this pause in the region's preeminent high-level intergovernmental forum and the Covid-19 pandemic, not all activity in the high north has been frozen. States have remained active within the Arctic—observer states have continued to articulate official strategies and pay senior-level official visits to the region, while hopeful observers, such as Estonia, are advocating for admission to the Arctic Council.2 It is clear that non-Arctic states' interest in the polar region [End Page 39] has not waned. This essay examines the Arctic interests and development of one such non-Arctic observer—Singapore. Since its 2013 admission into the Arctic Council, Singapore has been referred to as the "unlikely candidate," the "odd one out," and an "Arctic novice."3 It is, however, time to move beyond such a narrative for the nonregional observer states for several reasons. First, the status and the future of the Arctic Council itself are unclear and, at best, bifurcated. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which has gravely violated international law, has resulted in the other seven Arctic Council state members—Canada, the United States, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark (now known as the A-7)—announcing their unanimous suspension of cooperation within the council.4 Second, nearly a decade has passed since the Asian states were admitted as observers.5 During this time, these states have made countless engagements with the region. Third, the concept of Arctic exceptionalism has come under increased scrutiny.6 The Arctic is not a discrete and isolated entity in international relations; what happens in the Arctic does not remain only in the Arctic, nor is the region unaffected by events elsewhere. Scholarship on the observer states needs to move beyond a perspective that questions their role in a compartmentalized region to one that examines their engagement in a globalized Arctic in flux. The first section provides background on Arctic governance and context for Singapore's progression to observer status in the Arctic Council. The second section assesses the state of the now indeterminate Arctic Council and Singaporean interests. In doing so, it postulates what the future of council observers might be and what a small state outside the high north can offer, given the current state of affairs in the Arctic. Finally, this essay concludes by assessing the necessity of an official Arctic policy and the path forward for tropical observer Singapore. [End Page 40] Background: The Arctic and Singapore Arctic governance Aside from global treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic7 is governed regionally by the high-level intergovernmental Arctic Council, the five coastal Arctic states (the Arctic Five—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States), and the Barents-Euro Arctic Council.8 One way to view the governance process is as concentric, expanding circles—the Arctic Five, the Arctic Five-Plus-Five (the Arctic Five with China, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, and South Korea), the newly formed A-7, the Arctic Council, and then Arctic Council with observers.9 In 2008 the Arctic Five agreed to continue to utilize the existing international law as outlined in UNCLOS for matters pertaining to the Arctic and decided against the need for a "new legal framework."10 Some hard treaties, such as UNCLOS, the Polar Code, and the Montreal Protocol, govern the region but...

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