For Canada, Insularism Leads to a Lost Opportunity in the Arctic and Asia

For Canada, Insularism Leads to a Lost Opportunity in the Arctic and Asia Jeffrey Reeves (bio) For decades, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have invested in and expanded their presence in the Arctic, often working together with each other or cooperating with Russia or the Nordic Arctic states to increase their regional impact. Indeed, in terms of institutional development, climate change research, port development, or icebreaker technologies, these four Asian actors have been at the forefront of Arctic activity since the early 2000s, bringing both state-backed development plans and resources to the region. As a result, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore have become essential actors in the high north, as they singularly and collectively provide finance and capabilities equal to—if not in excess of—any littoral state. Whereas the 20th century was the trans-Atlantic era of Arctic development, the growth of activity by Asian states suggests that 21st-century Arctic affairs will be decidedly more global, if not also more Asian, in orientation.1 Traditional Arctic actors Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia have embraced engagement with Asian states interested in the Arctic and established bilateral and multilateral modalities to facilitate even deeper regional cooperation.2 Norway and Russia, for instance, have worked with Asian countries on matters of regional governance, particularly with respect to fisheries agreements, natural resource management, shipping, and environmental protection.3 Similarly, Sweden has integrated bilateral and multilateral engagement with several Asian states into its own strategic approach to the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional trade facilitation and expansion, scientific governance, and geothermal energy [End Page 12] exploration and development.4 Finland and Iceland, too, have sought deeper ties with Asian states, including India, on high north matters such as science, research, and education.5 For the Nordic states, both a desirability and an inevitability inherent in their approach to engagement with Asian actors carry with them a transformative potential toward Arctic affairs.6 The government of Canada, conversely, has not pursued a policy of cooperation with any Asian state on Arctic affairs, preferring instead to work with its traditional U.S. and European partners on issues ranging from governance to regional security.7 This essay examines Canada's failure to integrate Asian actors in the Arctic into its Arctic policy and activities as well as the implications for Canadian policy, not just toward the north but also in the Asia-Pacific. Canada's Arctic Policy—Traditional Alignment Under the Trudeau administration, in particular, Canada has pursued an Arctic policy predicated on alignment with Western "like-minded states" and Western institutions like the Arctic Council and the G-7.8 Whereas the Trudeau administration does mention Asia in its Arctic policy, it does so solely in relation to "limiting" Chinese activity through closer coordination with its Western partner institutions, notably NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).9 Rather than mirroring the Nordic states' more inclusive approach to involving external actors in the Arctic, Canada instead maintains an Arctic policy more closely [End Page 13] aligned with that of the United States—one prioritizing Arctic sovereignty, territorial defense, and regional order.10 Three aspects of Canada's Arctic policy are worth highlighting when considering its disinterest in cooperating with and involving Asian states in the region. First, Canada's Arctic priorities are almost entirely domestic, with seven of the 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy Framework's eight agenda items focusing on matters such as inclusive growth, job creation, infrastructure development, community preservation, and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.11 While laudable in its intent, the Trudeau administration's predilection for domestic affairs in the Arctic results in a policy that is inherently inward looking. Relegated to a secondary priority, the government's Arctic foreign policy approach is correspondingly underdeveloped, conservative, and inflexible. Second, and related, Canada's federalist system requires the central government to negotiate with Indigenous, territorial, and provincial representatives and governments to determine the country's Arctic policies and priorities.12 While this is a feature, not a bug, of Canada's decentralized system of government, this approach means domestic, not foreign, considerations drive the federal government's Arctic policy.13 The 2019 framework, for instance, pays almost...

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