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Enregistrement W4321786096 · doi:10.5463/thesis.64

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2023· dissertation· en· W4321786096 sur OpenAlexfundno aff
Evert Boonstra

Notice bibliographique

Revuenon disponible
Typedissertation
Langueen
DomaineArts and Humanities
ThématiquePhilosophy and History of Science
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesH2020 European Research CouncilAmsterdam Brain and CognitionHorizon 2020 Framework ProgrammeCanadian Institute for Advanced Research
Mots-clésCognitive scienceHegelianismDialecticEpistemologySet (abstract data type)PerceptionPerspective (graphical)PsychologyReading (process)Computer sciencePhilosophyArtificial intelligence

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

The present dissertation took the free-energy principle (FEP) as its starting point, from which we tried to draw both philosophical and empirical consequences. Both chapter 2 and 3 departed from the idea that conscious perception depends on global amplification of sensory input, and that the basal ganglia (BG) and its irrigation by dopamine play a crucial role in gating information, conscious access, and the selection of a relevant internal model given available sensory data. The BG are thought to play this role due to their modulatory influence on thalamocortical connectivity. Because much of the evidence implicating the BG in these processes in humans is correlational, we explored two ways of manipulating BG activity experimentally. Chapter 4 investigates the philosophical heritage implicitly touched on by the FEP, which provides an alternative philosophical and historical background for present-day research in cognitive neuroscience. Friston’s FEP has been received with great enthusiasm. With good reason: it not only makes the bold claim to a unifying theory of the brain, but it is presented as an a priori principle applicable to living systems in general. In this paper, we set out to show how the breadth of scope of Friston’s framework converges with the dialectics of Georg Hegel. Through an appeal to the work of Catherine Malabou, we aimed to demonstrate how Friston not only reinvigorates Hegelian dialectics from the perspective of neuroscience, but that the implicit alignment with Hegel necessitates a reading of the FEP from the perspective of Hegel’s speculative philosophy. It is this reading that moves beyond the discussion between cognitivism and enactivism surrounding Friston’s framework; beyond the question whether the organism is a secluded entity separated from its surroundings, or whether it is a dynamical system characterized by perpetual openness and mutual exchange. From a Hegelian perspective, it is the tension between both positions itself that is operative at the level of the organism; as a contradiction the organism sustains over the course of its life. Not only does the organism’s secluded existence depend on a perpetual relation with its surroundings, but the condition for there to be such a relation is the existence of a secluded entity. We intended to show how this contradiction – tension internalized – is at the center of Friston’s anticipatory organism; how it is this contradiction that grounds the perpetual process of free energy minimization. Chapter 5 is the report of a study attempting to contrast the FEP’s perspective with that of traditional cognitive neuroscience. While the FEP casts the brain as an organism’s predictive model of how its world works and will continue to work in the future in which action is afforded a central place, research on the brain’s predictive capacities remains beholden to traditional research practices in which participants are passively shown stimuli without their active involvement (as we also did in Chapters 2 and 3). The current study is an investigation into ways in which self-generated predictions may differ from externally induced predictions. Participants completed a volatile spatial attention task under both conditions (externally/cue-induced, internally/action-induced) on different days. We used the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter, an approximate Bayesian inference model, to determine subject-specific parameters of belief-updating and inferred volatility. We found preliminary evidence in support of self-generated predictions incurring a larger reaction time cost when violated compared to predictions induced by sensory cue, which translated to participants’ increased sensitivity to changes in environmental volatility. Our results suggest that internally generated predictions may be afforded more weight, but these results are complicated by session order and duration effects, as well as a lack of statistical power.

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Théorique ou conceptuel · Signal consensuel: Théorique ou conceptuel
GenreSignal candidat: Autre · Signal consensuel: Autre
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,176
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,587

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,005
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,001
Bibliométrie0,0010,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0040,004
Communication savante0,0080,006
Science ouverte0,0010,006
Intégrité de la recherche0,0020,004
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,1760,072

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,066
Tête enseignante GPT0,260
Écart entre enseignants0,194 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeThéorique ou conceptuel
Domainenon disponible
GenreAutre

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2023
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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