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Enregistrement W4379621481 · doi:10.1353/iur.2019.a838202

‘America First’ in the ILO: assertive, yet unaccountable

2019· article· en· W4379621481 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Daniel Blackburn

Notice bibliographique

RevueInternational Union Rights · 2019
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueInternational Labor and Employment Law
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésRatificationDelegationPolitical scienceConventionLawCaucusEnthusiasmPoliticsPsychology

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

From the very outset, the US had an unusual relationship with the ILO: it was not itself a member of the ILO at its founding but the first International Labour Conference in 1919 was held in Washington, and the US Secretary of Labor chaired the session. In 1934 the US joined the ILO, and in 1938 it ratified its first five ILO conventions, although this enthusiasm rapidly tailed off. Through the 1940s the US ratified only one more convention, with a further single ratification in the 1950s, and no further ratifications at all through the 1960s and 1970s. Into the late 1980s and 1990s there were only a handful of further ratifications, leaving the US with an abysmal record of ratification overall. To date it has ratified just 14 of 189 ILO Conventions, including only two of the fundamental or ‘core’ instruments. In 1948 the ILO Conference was held in San Francisco, at which session Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association was adopted. The US delegation at the Conference voted unanimously in favour of the instrument, and ratification of the instrument was subsequently recommended by the Secretary of Labor, and submitted to the Senate by letter on 27 August 1949, signed by President Truman. But here the ratification process stalled. Somewhat incredibly, 70 years later, this advice remains technically ‘pending’ before the Senate1. In 1977, the US withdrew from the ILO altogether. But the retreat was short lived, and just over two years later the US re-joined. Its return was welcome, not only politically, but also as the largest contributor to the Organisation, paying 22 percent of the ILO’s budget. Altogether, US contributions to the Organisation are in the region of US$100 million per year, comprised of both regular funding and support to the ILO’s technical assistance programmes. Perhaps emboldened by its importance as a donor, the US has never been shy to push its agenda within the ILO, where US delegates frequently speak out against other States for breach of the freedom of association instruments. But, while keen to hold others to account, the US itself has throughout remained almost entirely unaccountable to ILO’s core processes, which concern only those countries that have ratified the Conventions. The US position used to gain a sort of regional camouflage due to the fact that its neighbours, Mexico and Canada, had both held off ratification of ILO Convention 98. But following the ratification of that instrument by both countries (somewhat ironically, both nudged by US pressure during the negotiation of the USMCA trade agreement, which obliged Mexico in particular to effect extensive changes to its collective bargaining framework2), the US now stands out like a sore thumb as the only country in the Americas that has not ratified either of the core freedom of association conventions. Prospects for ratification In the first US follow-up report to the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the government acknowledged that ‘aspects of [the US system] fail to fully protect the rights to organise and bargain collectively of ail employees in all circumstances’. But its subsequent report stated simply that US law and practice are ‘generally in compliance’ with ILO principles. Over the following decade the US variously reported ‘no developments’, ‘no change’ in policy, or ‘no current plans to pursue ratification’ of either Convention. In 2015, however, the US reported to the ILO that on 15 May 2014 a presidential committee had agreed that its Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS) would ‘intensify its work of reviewing the legal feasibility of US ratification of selected ILO Conventions, including Conventions 87 and 98’. This development, however, is now of no more than historical interest, following the election of Donald Trump at the close of 2016. In the early stage of the Trump presidency, there were fears that the US might significantly reduce its participation in many UN forums, with budget cuts of 50 percent mooted3. The ILO itself has been among those agencies earmarked for cuts at this level4. So far, the US Congress has blocked many of the proposed cuts, and the ILO budget anticipates US contributions continuing at the regular level5. Against...

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,009
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,015
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Théorique ou conceptuel · Signal consensuel: Théorique ou conceptuel
GenreSignal candidat: Autre · Signal consensuel: Autre
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,024
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,048

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0090,015
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0010,002
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0110,018
Communication savante0,0240,017
Science ouverte0,0020,007
Intégrité de la recherche0,0070,023
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0130,004

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,011
Tête enseignante GPT0,295
Écart entre enseignants0,284 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeThéorique ou conceptuel
Domainenon disponible
GenreAutre

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2019
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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