Notice bibliographique
Résumé
It is the best of times for Canada’s public markets, it is the worst of times for Canada’s public markets. It is an age when markets have been rewarding public companies with the highest valuations seen in generations. It is an age of a rapid decline in Canadian companies opting to go public. Given that Canada’s reliance on public markets is far higher than that of any other country — double that of the next-highest country — we should be alarmed that fewer and fewer companies are choosing to go public. Companies that stay private are, on average, less successful, less productive, less likely to grow into national champions, and more likely to be sold to foreign buyers. The current decline of public markets may go to the heart of what is arguably the biggest long-term policy issue in the country: our innovation gap and declining relative productivity growth. There is no shortage of advantages for a company to go public. Public companies grow faster, grow larger, become both more productive and efficient, and have cheaper access to capital. An IPO permits early investors to exit while allowing managers to continue to build the company. What is evidently causing more and more Canadian executives to avoid going public, despite all these advantages, is a regulatory and governance ecosystem that has grown increasingly hostile to and distrustful of corporate leadership. Executives who consider going public face an environment in which their compensation levels will be high; indeed, pay for senior executives at public companies has grown remarkably in recent years. However, because of increasingly onerous regulatory disclosure requirements, earning those rewards comes at the cost of having their pay disclosed to the public, debated by shareholders and scrutinized by the media. Companies that go public also face a growing loss of control over their own governance due to pressure to adhere to an ever-evolving list of so-called universal best practices that can run dozens of pages long. These practices exact costs but don’t generally improve results. The result is a dominant one-size-fits-all governance model that does not in fact fit many, or even most companies. The key factor creating this hostile environment is a massive intrusion by outside forces on the powers traditionally exercised by boards and executives. Corporate governance used to arise from the bargaining and experimentation of the private parties that coalesce around corporations. Now governance is frequently imposed ex post on public companies by third parties with their own agendas. Particularly problematic are third-party commercial proxy advisors, ostensibly representing the interests of institutional shareholders. Their short-term, faddish, complex, and value-harming governance practices diverge dangerously from the interests of long-term flesh-and-blood investors. The innovations over the past three decades in governance rules were designed to reduce agency costs and improve corporate performance. Those that have proven failures at doing so, and there are several, should be scrapped. Rather than helping Canada’s markets become stronger, public markets have grown substantially weaker, and rather than making Canadian companies better, we now face an environment where companies would rather sell to a foreign buyer and leave the country, than go public here. The repercussions can only be adverse for Canada.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,004 | 0,010 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,003 | 0,003 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,014 | 0,005 |
| Communication savante | 0,014 | 0,006 |
| Science ouverte | 0,003 | 0,004 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,004 | 0,007 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,043 | 0,003 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».