Metaphysical Optimality and Intelligent Design

Both Nicholas Rescher and Max Planck are well-versed in physics and Leibniz's writings, both are, indeed, Leibnizeans. Both think that a version of the Principle of Least Action is fundamental to physics and metaphysics. One is a distinguished late-modern philosopher, the other a distinguished late-modern physicist. Why the dramatic difference? Rescher explains: “There is no point in bringing heavy machinery to work where lessor mechanisms can do the work” (SMO, 88). The lesser mechanisms in question are those of natural teleology understood in the Aristotelian sense, the kind of teleology in Rescher's theory of Metaphysical Optimality. The heavy machinery is a divine intelligence. My ultimate purpose in this paper is to explicate and adjudicate the conflicting attitudes to cosmology and teleology of Rescher, Planck and Leibniz.In Section I, I consider Rescher's doctrine of Metaphysical Optimality: his theory of natural teleology in the cosmos. First, I concentrate on how it handles the question of chance as the explanation for the co-occurrence of intelligent-life-promoting conditions on earth. Next, I explain Rescher's Metaphysical Optimality and the category of explanations, Optimality Explanations, which it embodies. Then I argue for a principle connecting chances and causes, the No Middle Ground Principle on the basis of a thought experiment. Finally, I show that there is a problem for Metaphysical Optimality if this principle is sound and that a solution to this problem requires heavy lifting of the kind that a postulation of divine intelligence could provide.In Section II, I consider whether we can find the premises for an a posteriori proof of the intelligent-design version of teleology in the metaphysical and physical assumptions of Leibniz. I conclude that we can, but that the proof suffers from an out-of-date physical assumption about the nature of light.In Section III I consider another proof for the existence of intelligent design, this time from Max Planck. This account does not suffer from an out-of-date account of the nature of light nor does it suffer from any other deficiencies that I can detect.Rescher's own brand of Leibnizean metaphysics is a view he calls “Metaphysical Optimality.” According to Rescher, Metaphysical Optimality is a brand of Leibnizean metaphysics because it is governed by a fundamental principle of the good as a goal, not of God's deliberations (divine-reason telos) but of nature's “inherent tropism”—natural telos in Aristotle's sense (SMO, 46–47). Rescher thinks that the “lessor” conception of optimality-directed telos will do, notwithstanding the fact that Leibniz evidently did not.There is, however, some difficulty in understanding what a natural telos is on Rescher's understanding. One possibility is that it consists in a natural striving or seeking, a kind of goal-directed activity carried out in nature that is like a person's striving or seeking, but without the person. In some places Rescher seems to lean toward this understanding, for example, in his reliance on an analogy to explain the idea of natural telos: it is “as if” an intelligent designer with the goal of producing a cosmos with intelligent life had designed the cosmos, but without the intelligent designer (SMO, 2). Elsewhere, however, Rescher seems to take a different tack, arguing that nature could have certain biases towards the emergence of intelligent life (SMO, 6, note 1). This argument occurs in the case he makes against intelligent life emerging simply by chance and can be made independently of the “as-if” model of natural teleology. I begin with that case.Part of Rescher's program is directed against cosmologists who argue that the conditions necessary for the development of life, and of intelligent life should they differ, here on earth is simply a result of chance. They1 say that there are various combinations of conditions that can occur, most are inimical to the development of life, but here and there some are supportive of it. We happen to be in one of those places. There is no warrant in supposing that some mysterious principle is operating in nature that favors the development of life-supporting combinations of conditions. This is the Chance Hypothesis.One of the most commonly used rules in Statistics, used in the “T-test,” is a rule that allows one to “reject the null hypothesis,” keyed to a pre-set level of statistical significance. The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that the pattern of variables in the population from which the data-sample is collected is just “due to chance.” If we are able to reject this possibility then we can accept that there is “something going on” with the variables in that population, that is, that there is a correlation among the variables in the population. A correlation is a kind of bias in the data and here I explore the possibility that the kind of bias in nature towards the emergence of intelligent life that Rescher has in mind is a correlational bias of some kind.One of the most commonly used rules in Statistics, used in the “T-test,” is a rule that allows one to “reject the null hypothesis,” keyed to a pre-set level of statistical significance. The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that the pattern of variables in the population from which the data-sample is collected is just “due to chance.” If we are able to reject this possibility then we can accept that there is “something going on” with the variables in that population, that is, that there is a correlation among the variables in the population. A correlation is a kind of bias in the data and here I explore the possibility that the kind of bias in nature towards the emergence of intelligent life that Rescher has in mind is a correlational bias of some kind.There are techniques in statistics to measure correlations in data. For example, Pearson's r2 statistic is a measure of correlation known as the “correlation co-efficient.” This measure is keyed to degrees of variability in the data, which in turn is a measure of correlations. Another approach2 to determining correlations in data is derived in analogy with the definition of probabilistic independence in Probability Theory: Two events e1 and e2 are probabilistically independent iff pr(e1) = pr(e1/e2).From this principle and the general conjunction rule for probability, pr(p&q) = pr(p/q).pr(q)we can infer the following theorem: p and q are probabilistically independent iff pr(p&q) = pr(p).pr(q)To say that p and q occur together by chance is to say that they are probabilistically independent in this sense.Now, we cannot tell by observation what the probability of an event is, since we cannot determine the truth of modal statements simply by observation, and probability, on the classical interpretation, is a modal notion: it is the ratio of an actual case to the set of all possible cases. However, we can observe relative frequencies of variables in a set of data, for example, the number of days on which a person wears red socks, the number of days it is sunny and the number of days they are wearing red socks when it is sunny. If there is no difference between the observed frequency of wearing red socks simpliciter and the frequency of wearing red socks when it is sunny, then we can say, in analogy with the notion of probabilistic independence, that sunny days are statistically independent of wearing red socks.From the definition of statistical independence of events and the general rule for determining the relative frequency of conjunctions of events, analogous to that for the rule for probability, we can derive the following theorem: Events e1 and e2 are statistically independent iff fr(e1&e2) = fr(e1) x fr(e2).We can now use observational methods for determining whether two events are statistically independent of one another in a given sample. A simple method for doing so, effective for the purpose of assessing whether life-supporting combinations of conditions are due to chance, involves setting up columns of data. In the case of two variables, v1 and v2 there will be three columns—one for v1, one for v2, and one for the conjunction of v1 and v2. For example, the first variable might be occurrences of thunder, the second occurrences of lightning, the third the conjunction of these. We record these data in three columns. Relative frequencies are then calculated for each column, and simple arithmetic tells us whether the frequency in the third column equals the frequency in the second times the frequency in the first. This method also yields a numerical measure of degrees of correlation in the data, from 0 to 1.3 (See the Appendix for a detailed working-out of this example.)An important final point. This method by itself does not tell us whether chance is operating in the whole population of events, but there are tests available in standard inferential statistics, e.g., the T-test, that will allow us to “reject the null hypothesis,” that is, to reject the supposition that chance is operating in the whole population of events. In this way we can have rational grounds (according to standard statistics4) for rejecting the chance hypothesis, though not certainty.Now let's apply this method to an interpretation of Rescher's case for a bias in nature for the emergence of intelligent life. But precisely what kind of bias? My suggestion is that it is going to be a correlational bias possibly to be found among conditions in the cosmos necessary for the emergence of intelligent life.Say that we are interested in determining whether two variables which have life supporting properties, LS1 and LS2, which co-occur on our planet, are there by chance. We now select at random a set of data with three columns, one for the first variable, one for the second and one for their conjunction. We make observations of other planetary systems, s1, s2, . . . sn. These correspond to days on which observation of thunder and lightning were made in our example. We then record check marks as appropriate, calculate relative frequencies and determine whether the identity holds. If it does, we conclude that chance is operating, if it does not, we conclude that there is a correlation For example, we find that the relative frequency of LS1 is out of observed have this of is of and of the conjunction both are observed is In this case the identity x = we infer that there is a correlation between these two variables, though in this case the correlation is If the relative frequency of the conjunction the it could then the correlation is at This number that time the first variable the second is there is important in this is not the frequency at which these variables could be the frequency with which the conjunction of these variables occurs in with the frequencies this in the fact that these variables are observed to occur is not important to the of we also at the at which they I do not what that is in the actual but us that they occur at a frequency that a statistically level of This is a of but it is an assumption that might be if it is then we can use this data in a statistically sound argument to reject the hypothesis that these variables co-occur in the cosmos as a whole by chance. But if not by chance, then by Rescher's be by a correlational bias among variables necessary for the development of intelligent that we have three that are no of can occur between or from an to In each a is to be say that the probability for each is is the probability that the result will be three it will be x x If the are and then the probability will be x x This is because we think that the conjunction of up in and up in and up in is calculated by the of chance. we have the following there is no between the events in then the conjunction of events is governed by the of chance.” this the take the of the conjunction of events is not governed by the of chance then there is a between the there is no this the No Middle Ground These are two of one they are notion of at here is that of a that could be The in question the metaphysical category a general for example, in account of has a detailed theory of physical these and it is this theory of in the physical which I on Principle tells us that a in Probability or be to occur on the basis of an fact about the in this case the of certain of in certain of and I that we in of the of and that we have methods for the of of for the of these we can, in determine whether the of the Principle and from the and the principle we can the of chance or in events. But in it will be to do However, we can both in principle and in determine when correlations are in our data. this and the No Middle Ground we can the of This makes the the of the two of the idea in Rescher's doctrine of Metaphysical Optimality is that the natural as if it designed by an intelligent designer who the of intelligent life in the and a to that this is Rescher this doctrine as in the sense, that is, as by a principle that what is actual is what is among a set of possible this idea Rescher then a that one can explain in two different by has to be and by that is the case because it is for the The of is a to a as is the but these are make to causes, do makes the which will important to our that the is as it is by to intelligent is a an explanation by going on in the mind of the in of do and not of conditions (SMO, this also as the because of to a this explanation does not as an is not a of the of A it as then this will as a for . . . 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The that these conditions are is the one that we accept as This is in with Rescher's account of Optimality The here is not in itself are not for to just for what is the However, as in the correlations have a the No Middle Ground This principle has a it the possibility in general that where there are there are no A it the possibility that there is a correlation bias among conditions without an to explain it. The possibility is that there is a note that there is no Optimality do not their by there is to with from by the of Optimality there is, some heavy lifting to do to the existence of a correlational bias in of conditions the of Optimality does not of that the machinery has to be intelligent design, but it might the intelligent-design version of teleology is a and it could explain a correlational bias among conditions is also the machinery by Rescher for heavy if were We can now that is Rescher's of that possibility an is But a is one bringing it to life I to do this in two one due to Leibniz in Section II, the other due to Planck in Section proof is on two the a metaphysical the a physical a account of explanation that by of of the is not to say that made a general for this there be a natural of that is, it is necessary that what can be the nature that to is here that on their be a natural of on to explain this idea with what can be the nature that to in the nature of that explain other 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