Reaching a Better Fiscal Balance: Alternative Spending and Revenue Arrangements Between the Federal Government and the Provinces
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Over the years, Canada’s equalization program has frequently attracted attention and controversy. Pointing to significant differences in equalization payments received by provinces, several premiers have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the program and have proposed various modifications to the current formula. But while equalization amounts to almost $20 billion for the 2019-2020 fiscal year, it represents only a part of Canada’s fiscal landscape. There are numerous ways by which hundreds of billions in spending and revenue dollars flow between the federal government and the provinces. The diversity in spending needs and tax capacities across regions contributes to the uneven distribution of federal expenditures and revenues collected. Taking stock of the entire fiscal landscape, rather than focusing on a single component like equalization, provides the necessary context when considering changes to Canada’s fiscal regime. This Capstone examines alternative fiscal arrangements between the federal government and the provinces and measures the potential impacts of these arrangements on provincial budgets and on overall parity in the federation. Arrangements investigated include modifying the equalization program, shifting more income and consumption tax revenues from the federal government to provincial governments in exchange for lower federal transfers, and adjusting the allocation of federal transfers based on the notion that provinces with larger populations potentially benefit from economies of scale. If economies of scale exist, more populated provinces are able to provide the same level of public service at a lower cost and their governments will receive a lower federal transfer amount per person. This paper finds that modifications to equalization leads to greater parity but places tremendous burden on regions that have lower fiscal capacities and need equalization the most. [vi] Assigning a greater share of government revenues to the provinces in exchange for lower federal transfers results in more manageable impacts to provincial budgets as well as conveying greater fiscal accountability on provincial governments. However, regions that have lower tax capacities still face greater impacts relative to others. Incorporating potential economies of scale in the allocation of federal transfers strikes a balance of desirable outcomes: the impacts to regions most in need of transfers are minimized, provinces with larger populations still receive a larger share of transfers, and the federal government keeps a significant portion of its transfer programs and influence on ensuring provincial governments deliver the level of public service Canadians expect. Since federal spending obligations will be lower, there is an opportunity to lower the federal tax burden on Canadians or to shift a greater share of the revenue base to provincial governments and further enhance fiscal accountability.
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| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
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| Science ouverte | 0,002 | 0,005 |
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| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,007 | 0,000 |
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