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The Administrative State Has Run Amok

2017· article· en· W6979761214 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff

Notice bibliographique

RevueeYLS (Yale Law School) · 2017
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineBusiness, Management and Accounting
ThématiqueRegulation and Compliance Studies
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésPejorativeCommissionState (computer science)Government (linguistics)Regulatory stateDemocracyProduct (mathematics)Harm
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Recently, this publication was gracious enough to publish a two-part essay I wrote on the issue of regulatory reform from the perspective of a Commissioner at the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). My ever-attentive, ever-thoughtful colleague, Commissioner Robert S. Adler, was inspired to pen a retort, and, in the spirit of the stimulating intellectual exchange we regularly enjoy, I would like to offer a reply. In my original essay, I encouraged the use of four regulatory best practices that, among others, could improve the regulatory work product from CPSC and agencies across the federal government. These included: The central thrust of Commissioner Adler’s response is that the analytical tools I endorsed, despite having been advocated by presidents, both Democratic and Republican, as far back as President Jimmy Carter and reflected in some—though not enough—agency statutes, somehow constitute “paralysis by analysis.” That is, these tools inconvenience regulators who would much rather govern by whim and impulse than by facts, science, data, and a recognition that Washington elitists do not, in fact, always know what is best. My colleague apparently did not hear President Bill Clinton more than 20 years ago when he proclaimed that the era (error?) of big government was over. Many unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats fail to recognize that Americans have grown weary of hearing that more regulation is the answer to all that ails us. Even some of the most ardent consumerists recognize that “regulation” has effectively become a pejorative term in Washington. In a recent hearing, Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) couldn’t even bring himself to say it, admitting—perhaps in a Freudian slip—that “nobody likes the word regulation these days.” For over a decade, Gallup polling has consistently found that Americans believe regulations are placing too great a burden on our economy. This sentiment resulted late last year in the largest electoral upheaval the country has seen in generations—a fact that my colleague does not appear to have yet come to grips with. In the absence of some badly needed regulatory reforms, the administrative state has run amok, with the total annual cost of regulation now nearly two trillion dollars. That is 11 percent of total Gross Domestic Product. If U.S. regulation were a country, it would have the world’s ninth largest economy, right between Russia and India. This has real consequences for our country: the World Economic Forum currently ranks the United States 51st in the world for the compliance burden imposed by regulation, sandwiching us between Bhutan and Guatemala. When both American citizens and global indices have awoken to the realization that regulation in our country is out of control, it is worth asking: why hasn’t the bureaucratic establishment? They want agencies to be able to continue doing what they have always done, no matter how great a competitive disadvantage our country is placed at or how many good government reforms have been put forward. Professor Adler, accustomed to the luxury of tenure, no doubt instinctively seeks to protect agencies from the inconvenience of change. Fortunately, a change is coming regardless of whether he chooses to accept it. The last few months have seen progress from both the White House and Congress in holding agencies accountable for overly burdensome regulation. An executive order from President Donald Trump directed agencies to repeal two existing regulations for every new one promulgated. Such “pay-go” schemes have worked remarkably well in Canada and the United Kingdom, the latter of which has now expanded to a one-in, three-out requirement. Another executive order requires each agency to designate individuals and task forces with the responsibility of ensuring their agency is following the President’s regulatory reform mandates. While these executive orders do not apply to independent agencies, CPSC is fortunate to have a new acting chairman inclined to voluntarily comply with the spirit of them. Congressional momentum is similarly moving toward regulatory reform, with numerous examples of good government legislation proceeding quickly through both chambers. I hope CPSC engages proactively, looking for any opportunity to improve its own regulatory product. If, instead, we dig our heels in and insist that a 1970s approach to product safety regulation makes sense in the 21st century, I predict we will have more drastic measures imposed upon us. There is no doubt that change is inevitable—the only question is whether or not we will forfeit our opportunity to be in control of at least some of that change. The longer we play the victim, the more likely we will become one.

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,000
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesÉtudes des sciences et des technologies, Communication savante, Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,816
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,999

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0040,000
Communication savante0,0030,001
Science ouverte0,0010,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,002

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,054
Tête enseignante GPT0,285
Écart entre enseignants0,230 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2017
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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