The Role of Government in Economic Growth and Development: A Comparative Study of Malta and Iceland 1960-1980
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
This is a comparative study of the two small island states of Iceland and Malta in 1960-2000. It \nfocuses on the role of the two governments as they enacted public policies, intervened in the \nfunctioning of their economies and foreign trade, invested in infrastructure, enhanced human \ncapital and developed welfare states. The governments aspired to boost economic growth, \nimprove quality of life, raise living standards, increase exports, combat recessions, create jobs, \nreduce trade and economic volatility, reap political gains and advance foreign relations. \nThe thesis compares economic and political developments and their interplay, advancing \ninternational relations and different routes to European cooperation. With their emerging public \nsectors, political systems, and political customs and conflicts, both island states tried to secure \ntheir rights, livelihoods and positions amongst other European nations. \nAround 1960, Iceland´s economy was relatively advanced compared to Malta. Iceland \nwas a financially self-standing republic, financing growth through exports, foreign loans, \nMarshall Aid and locally accumulated capital; and gifted with prolific fishing grounds and rich \nrenewable energy resources. The national economy was vulnerable due to dependency on the \nvolatile fishery and its export markets. However, Iceland could not yet control and manage the \nfishing grounds, as they were open for foreign deep-sea trawlers until the mid-1970s. Iceland \nmaintained its focus on developing the fishery further during the last quarter of the twentieth \ncentury but with parallel government-driven developments in the power sector, while foreign \ninvestors built the associated power-intensive industries. A transferable quota system was \nintroduced and shaped in the fisheries from 1984 to the 1990s. The new system increased \nefficiencies and labour productivity and reduced the over-capacity of fleet and plants. The 1970s \nand 1980s were marked by slack macroeconomic policies - hyperinflation, frequent devaluations \nof the ISK, rampant over-investments, subsidies in farming and uneconomical redistributive \nsystems in fisheries. The economy became more liberal, diversified, and productive in the \n1990s, helped by the European Economic Area Agreement, which became effective in 1994. \nIn contrast to Iceland, Malta pursued rather stable macroeconomic policies throughout \nthe period considered. In the 1960s, Malta was at first preoccupied with the politics and \nadministrative issues of independence, which was achieved in 1964, and then during the \nremainder of the decade with preparations for diversifying and strengthening the economy in \niv \nreaction to a massive down-scaling of the workforce in the dockyards and the British services. \nThe 1960s saw a large-scale emigration. Based on local development plans and in line with \nadvice from foreign consultants, manufacturing for exports was targeted, and foreign technology \nand investments were attracted to Malta. Industrial estates were built, and incentives offered to \nforeign investors. Manufacturing firms, e.g. in textiles, electronics and pharmaceuticals, set up \nplants in Malta. New hotels were built in the 1960s, initiating a growing tourism industry. Air \nMalta was founded, and Malta became a popular tourist destination. In the 1990s and the 2000s, \nfinancial services emerged as another successful economic initiative. \nWhile Iceland restricted foreign investments and the shareholding of foreign firms in its \nstrategic sectors, i.e., the fishery and renewable power production, Malta used foreign \ninvestments to its advantage. Iceland and Malta took steps in easing foreign trade restrictions. \nIceland made its first move in liberalising domestic trade in 1960 and took a further step when it \njoined EFTA in 1970, involving a customs union with the EFTA countries. That same year, \nMalta signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC), \ncreating a customs union based on free trade between Malta and the EEC. \nMalta developed a rather centralised political system, while Iceland evolved a more \ndecentralised system. Malta inherited its political system from Britain, and Iceland its system \nfrom Denmark. Both had self-government, preceding the republic in Iceland (1944) and \nindependence in Malta (1964). The political system in Malta paved the way for two-party \npolitics, with one party in power and the other in opposition. Meanwhile, the Icelandic system \nfavoured multi-party politics, which needed coalitions of 2-4 parties at any time for a majority in \nthe parliament. Two government levels made the political processes in Iceland more \ncomplicated than in Malta, as many policies and programs had to be negotiated between the \nstate, the local authorities, the trade unions and business federations. One of the foremost \ndifferences between the two island states was the size of the landmass, topography, climate and \nlocation. It resulted in dissimilar political systems with a strong geographical dimension in \nIceland. Their dissimilar location in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean swayed their \nchoices of foreign trading partners and political allies towards adjacent neighbourly countries.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».