Nuclear weapons and German interests : an attempt at redefinition

Since 1995, a new debate about nuclear weapons has been under way. This no longer\nrelates only to arms control, but also to the possibility of the complete elimination of these\nweapons of mass destruction. Germany, torn between, on the one hand, its identity as a\nnon-nuclear-weapons state, and, on the other, its membership of NATO and the WEU and\nits close links with France, the USA, and Britain, occupies an awkward position in this\ndebate. It is not easy for it to define its own interests, let alone formulate a coherent policy.\nIn the past, the German stance combined verbal support for nuclear modernization with a\nhigh degree of loyalty to positions deriving from NATO’s strategy of first use of nuclear\nweapons against conventional and other types of military threat. Gradually, a separate\nGerman position, sometimes showing a marked divergence from that of certain other\nmembers of the alliance, crystallized out. Underlying this was the desire to keep the\ndiscrimination resulting from Germany’s distinct status to a minimum - not least as regards\nthe competitive interests of the German nuclear industry. This concern was expressed in\ndemands for an extension of international verification measures in nuclear-weapons states,\nand for greater transparency in regard to the stocks of weapons and fissile material held by\nsuch states.\nThe dramatic changes in the German security situation after 1990 did not lead to any\nradical redefinition of the German position on nuclear weapons, even though, in 1997,\nnotice was given for the very first time of the conditions in which the German government\nmight contemplate their complete elimination: reliable systems of verification, guaranteed\nsecurity by non-nuclear means, complete elimination of stocks of fissile material intended\nfor military purposes. This study aims to provide the missing redefinition.\nFrom this perspective, factors such as\n· self-restraint in power politics\n· European and Atlantic ties\n· multilateralism, and\n· regard for international law\nmay be seen as key components of German national interest, and not - as critics of German\nforeign policy have recently increasingly tended to do - as an expression of idealistic\nideology. This definition of Germany’s interests enjoys broad, cross-party political\nconsensus within the country, even if that consensus does not necessarily extend to the\nmodalities of its implementation.\nTranslating the consequences which this definition of German national interest has for\nnuclear policy into practical terms, we arrive at the following elements:\n· continued renunciation of nuclear weapons\n· reduction/elimination of discrimination resulting from status\n· strengthening of the principle of non-proliferation\n- II -\nreduction in the military and political role of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, actual\nnuclear disarmament\nGerman security within the multilateral framework is also best served by containing the\nthreats that result from the loss of control over Russian nuclear weapons and from the\nresidual risk of political regression by applying disarmament measures. Progress in the\ndisarmament process is, in any case, indispensable as a way of strengthening the nonproliferation\nregime. Whichever way one looks at it, disarmament turns out to be in the\nGerman interest.\nBy contrast, the classic security function of nuclear weapons within NATO strategy -\nnamely, to offset what the West perceived as the advantage to the Soviet Union from the\nimbalance in conventional, chemical, and biological weapons, and to scupper any idea\nwhich the Soviet leadership might have had of engaging in a war of aggression - has\ndisappeared. These preconditions of NATO doctrine, including first use, the deployment of\ntactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and opposition to the complete elimination of nuclear\nweapons, no longer apply. As a result, the German interest in disarmament now takes\nprecedence.\nThe limits to this interest lie at the point where uncompromising prosecution could lead to\nserious alienation from Germany’s most important partners. The basis of relations with\nFrance, Britain, and the USA must not be jeopardized by a radicalism that takes no account\nof the sensitivities of these nuclear-weapons states. Of course, the correct alternative is not\nanticipatory subservience. Being prepared for a degree of conflict is essential. The restraint\nin question here relates to style and strategy, not to basic stance and long-term objectives.\nThis requires that these principles be formulated in a clear and, if necessary, controversial\nform, and that the interim measures which one believes can be expected of one’s partners\nbe proposed and prosecuted even where they initially meet with resistance.\nFrom the point of view of security, attention should be focused on tactical nuclear\nweapons, for the reasons set out above. The huge Russian arsenal, which numerous reports\nhave shown to be inadequately controlled, is a source of risk that has to be neutralized. To\nachieve this, it will make sense, in any event, to put the tactical nuclear weapons which\nNATO has deployed in Europe up for consideration. If a complete renunciation of all\ntactical nuclear weapons cannot be achieved straight away, consolidation within central\nsites in the USA and Russia (if possible on the far side of the Urals) would be a secondbest\nsolution - in which case drastic reductions on the Russian side would be appropriate.\nOne possibility, as an interim step prior to the complete elimination of tactical nuclear\nweapons, would be to agree to as low a level of stocks as possible. A second priority would\nbe to achieve as great a degree of de-alerting as possible of strategic arsenals, thus\ndrastically reducing the danger of an erroneous or unauthorized launch of nuclear-armed\nmissiles.1\n1 Bruce G. Blair/Harold A. Feiveson/Frank von Hippel, ‘Taking Nuclear Weapons Off Hair-Trigger\nAlert’, Scientific American, Nov. 1997; Jonathan Dean, ‘De-alerting: A Move towards Disarmament’,\nUNIDIR Newsletter (July 1998).\n- III\nAs regards the goal of reducing discrimination, three measures must have priority. The first\nis transparency of the nuclear-weapons arsenals and stocks of fissile materials destined for\nmilitary purposes, to be assured through the creation of a register.2 Transparency of this\nkind would act as a counterweight to the privileged position of the nuclear-weapons states\nand would firmly establish the principle of accountability. The second priority is to provide\nthe Cut-off Treaty with a comprehensive verification-system which would place nuclearweapons\nand non-nuclear-weapons states more or less on a par in terms of verification\nobligations. Thirdly, the handing-over of fissile material removed from military use to the\nInternational Atomic Energy Organization for verification should be made both\ncompulsory and irreversible.3\nGiven its interests, it seems inappropriate for Germany to play the role of trusty henchman\nto the Western nuclear-weapons states. Like Canada and Australia - both reliable allies of\nthe USA - Germany should opt for the position of ‘bridge-builder’ between the nuclearweapons\nstates and their non-aligned critics.\n2 Harald Müller, A Nuclear Weapons Register: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Come (HSFK: PRIF Report\n51; Frankfurt/M., 1997); see also James Goodby, ‘Casting a Wider Net: Nuclear Arms Negotiations\nbeyond START II’, in Harold A. Feiveson (ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point. A Blueprint for Deep Cuts\nand Dealerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1999).\n3 Annette Schaper, ‘The Case for Universal Full-Scope Safeguards on Nuclear Material’, Nonproliferation\nReview, 5 (1998), 2: pp. 69–80.\n

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.