Common Law with Uncommon Regulations: the influence of legal tradition on campaign finance regimes
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Americans spent $11.4 billion in their last federal election cycle but collectively, the United Kingdom and Canada only spent a little over $550 million in their last general elections. These three states have similarities in democratic governance, economic legacy, and common law legal system grouping but how did they become so separated in campaign finance regulations? Prior research in the field of international comparative campaign finance law is limited and primarily focuses on using political theories to describe the movement of laws toward deregulation or regulation. This research seeks to find what influences the creation, preservation, and deregulation of campaign finance laws in these affluent Western states. Focusing on legal tradition, this research analyses the historical, institutional, and cultural components of law and society in each respective state. In tandem, this research uses textual analysis to look at every legally binding federal campaign finance law and judicial decision for each state is studied to see how legal tradition has affected trends of regulation or deregulation throughout the decades. Through this framework, this study finds that legal tradition has influenced three unique outcomes for the level of regulation in each state’s election finance regime. The United States’ legal tradition has invested considerable power in the judiciary, which has severely limited American legislators' ability to regulate elections. This judicial intervention and the legal tradition surrounding its power has resulted in severe deregulation of election finance laws. In the United Kingdom, a legal tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, an unwritten constitution, and a legal history of comity between legislators and the judiciary has resulted in a series of regulatory statutes that have not been weakened by other constitutional actors. Lastly, Canada’s legal tradition tells a story of political adversarial gain with both written and unwritten constitutions, parliamentary sovereignty, and weakened judiciary that has culminated in a back and forth of regulated and deregulated laws based on the leading majority political party. These states all operate in the common law system but if we look at them broadly in just that category of organization, we are unable to note the differences that have influenced diverging trends in regulating campaign finance regimes. This research is the first in the field of comparative campaign finance legal studies to emphasize the importance of analyzing the cultural, historical, and institutional factors of each respective state. Without this lens, we are unable to understand law as a social phenomenon and how these campaign finance laws are a part of a bigger picture that has been in the making for decades. Without this all-encompassing view of legal tradition, there is no way to determine if a law will stand institutional interventions or the test of time.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,002 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».