Non-referring Concepts. Technical Report 2003-03

Non-referring concepts are mental representations of nonexistent things like
\ndragons and time machines. Non-referring words are the words that express those
\nconcepts. In reference-based approaches to formal semantics, there is a well-known
\npuzzle about how non-referring words and concepts get their meanings. The default
\nsolution is that they are special cases, with a different semantic structure from their
\nreferring counterparts. Despite over a century of debate in formal semantics, the issue of
\nnon-reference has, until now, been ignored in the psychological literature on concepts.
\nBut it is not obvious in advance what the psychological structure and processing of nonreferring
\nconcepts will be like. Furthermore, experimental evidence about non-referring
\nconcepts can help resolve issues fundamental to both semantics and psychology, such as
\nthe nature of meaning, the nature of concepts, and the debate over representational
\nexternalism.
\nI used the methods of experimental psychology to provide the first empirical test
\nof the claim that non-referring concepts are a special kind of concept. I found that nonreferring
\nconcepts have a very similar structure to referring concepts. This finding
\nsuggests that many popular versions of reference-based semantics are flawed, perhaps
\nfatally. I also found that non-referring concepts take measurably longer to process than
\nreferring concepts. I argue that the best way of reconciling the second result with the first
\nis to make a distinction between the knowledge that is constitutive of a concept and the
\nknowledge that is external to it. Non-referring concepts are processed more cautiously
\nbecause we know that their referents do not exist – a fact that is about the world rather
\nthan the concept itself. This distinction is consistent with the apparently contradictory
\nevidence that motivates “Theory Theory” accounts of conceptual structure on one hand,
\nand similarity-based accounts such as prototype and exemplar theories on the other.
\nThis dissertation concerns the following topic areas: cognitive psychology,
\ncognitive science, concepts, empty names, externalism, internalism, mental
\nrepresentation, nonexistent objects, non-referring concepts, philosophy of language,
\nphilosophy of mind, prototypes, reference, semantics, similarity, and Theory Theory.

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