4.Y.1. PechaKucha: Value based payments: do they deliver on their promises? Recent experiences in Europe and Canada
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Abstract Background Healthcare spending in Europe has steadily increased, often without corresponding gains in value. In response to financial pressures, countries have sought to improve value either by reducing unnecessary costs or by increasing productivity or quality of care. One common strategy for this objective has been to replace input-based payments with “value-based” payments (VBP). Definitions of VBP vary, but VBP models typically bundle payments across episodes of care, chronic conditions, or patient populations across several providers. VBPs intend to shift financial risk from payers to providers, holding the latter accountable for the cost and quality of care delivered. They are designed to foster coordination among providers, and adopt a broader view of value, including care integration, cost reduction, and site optimization, and consider social risk factors to promote equity. Their strength lies in moving away from micromanagement, enabling providers across settings to collaborate flexibly. However, VBPs are not new, and evidence shows modest or no improvements in efficiency and quality, with varying impacts on healthcare spending, outcomes, and patient experience. Difficulties in adequately adjusting payments for patient and provider characteristics can result in risk selection and ‘gaming’ practices, undermining equity and quality. As a result, countries have increasingly refined VBP models to better manage risk and incentives, improve care coordination and increasingly involve patients in assessing quality of care, for example, by incorporating patient-reported outcome and experience measures (PROMs and PREMs). Objectives This workshop will present recent experiences with VBP models in Europe, highlighting their intended and unintended consequences. This discussion aims to inspire and inform other countries looking to design or (re)shape their own payment mechanisms. Format This will be an interactive session and engage the audience. 1. The first presentation will define and characterize VBP, highlighting examples across six countries. Three case studies will showcase how different VBP models tackle previous limitations: 2. Article 51 promotes innovations in the French health system. Three pilots will be presented, including “coordinated care pathways” and capitation, that bundle payments for primary care across providers to integrate care; and pay for performance add-ons to promote quality of care. 3. The German “Quality contracts” aim to foster provider competition based on quality, and account and pay hospitals for quality of care, inter alia, with PROMs as indicators. Yet, it does not always reduce costs. 4. An experiment in the Netherlands tackles this problem by unconventionally replacing fee-for-service by SES-risk-adjusted capitation for oral health. The aims are to reduce unnecessary treatment and costs, while also minimizing social inequalities. Key messages • While policies to reform payment mechanisms are usually relatively easy-to-implement, if they are not accompanied by other policy tools they are unlikely to achieve all intended objectives. • The implementation of VBPs can result in unintended consequences, which may be mitigated through careful design balancing the risks between payers and providers, while accounting for quality of care. Speakers/Panellists Maiwenn Meyer Caisse nationale de l’Assurance Maladie, Paris, France Yohan Wloczysiak Caisse Nationale de l’Assurance Maladie, Paris, France Lukas Schöner TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany Stefan Listl Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
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Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,007 | 0,010 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,003 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,006 | 0,004 |
| Communication savante | 0,008 | 0,003 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,003 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,003 | 0,004 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,020 | 0,002 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».