Princípio federativo tributário: novas perspectivas após a Emenda Constitucional n. 132/2023

This work analyzes the implications of Constitutional Amendment 132/2023 (Tax Reform) on the Brazilian federative principle, investigating whether the changes made to the National Tax System violate the essential core of the autonomy of federated entities, protected as a constitutional clause by Article 60, § 4, item I of the Federal Constitution. The justification lies in the need to examine the constitutionality of tax innovations that, under the pretext of simplification and modernization, may compromise structural elements of the federative pact. The central hypothesis maintains that the creation of the Goods and Services Tax Management Committee (CGIBS) and the establishment of the shared competence regime represent excessive centralization that substantially undermines the tax autonomy of States, the Federal District, and Municipalities, constituting a violation of constitutional clauses. From a theoretical standpoint, the work is based on the theory of cooperative federalism, the constitutional dogmatics of constitutional clauses, and the doctrine of material limitations to the reforming power. Methodologically, the deductive method is adopted for the analysis of constitutional norms, complemented by Theodor Viehweg's legal topics as a technique of problematic thinking for examining the constitutional aporias generated by the reform. Comparative law is employed through the study of the experiences of India, Canada, and the principle of German federative loyalty (Bundestreue), offering parameters for evaluating the Brazilian model. The results demonstrate that Constitutional Amendment 132/2023 results in material unconstitutionality by compulsorily transferring essential administrative competencies – issuance of a single regulation, collection, distribution of revenues, and administrative litigation – to the CGIBS, transforming the traditional exclusive tax competence into hierarchical shared competence that dilutes the fiscal sovereignty of subnational entities. The application of legal topics, through the topoi of federative autonomy, the impossibility of compulsory transfer of competencies, and the preservation of federative balance, confirms the unconstitutionality of centralizing innovations. It is concluded that, although tax simplification constitutes a legitimate objective, its implementation cannot occur by violating the essential core of the federative pact, requiring the reformulation of the proposed model to ensure compatibility with constitutional limits, through mechanisms of voluntary cooperation that preserve the capacity for tax self-management as a nuclear element of federative autonomy protected by constitutional clauses

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