An empirical study of scientists' reasoning in the Canadian regulatory evaluation of traditional, homeopathic, herbal and other "natural" medicines

How do one hundred scientists reason in a uniform manner during the regulatory review of proposed medicines? This ethnographic account of scientists' reasoning is based on thirteen months of anthropological fieldwork among the hundred scientists in a Canadian government directorate mandated to assess the safety and efficacy of proposed medicines while "respecting philosophical and cultural diversity." The scientists themselves cannot be considered uniform. They were born in numerous countries around the world and educated in many scientific disciplines. Many scientists were also health practitioners, in a variety of traditions. The scientists expressed a wide range of opinions about the usefulness of traditional medicines and other "natural health products." This dissertation describes the ways in which scientists reasoned in their assessment work. Many scientists attributed the uniformity in their reasoning to their use of standards and to their frequent consultation of expert peers. I argue that these activities do not account for the most striking features of scientists' uniform style of reasoning, including scientists': directed perception; repetition of phrases like "we have to be flexible" in situations of uncertainty; acute sensitivity to fairness; common affective dispositions towards certain file traits; agnostic perspective towards the relation of textual standards to "reality"; and consideration of the licensing backlog. These features were inseparable from the omnipresent tools of managerialism such as quotas for the number of evaluations to be completed weekly. Certain of these striking features appeared to be further entrenched by the temporary, rather than permanent, appointment of half the scientific staff to their positions. This uniform style of reasoning had very little, if anything, to do with scientists' pre-existing "beliefs" and convictions. I argue that scientists were interpellated into this style of reasoning (including common directed perception and affective dispositions) through participation in the material and social structuring of activities in the Directorate, even though the pre-structuring of reasoning activities was never fully determined. The dissertation begins and ends with Ludwik Fleck's observation that "every epistemological theory is trivial that does not take th[e] sociological dependence of all cognition into account in a fundamental and detailed manner" (1979:43).

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