Transitioning Fragile States: A Sequencing Approach
Pourquoi ce travail est dans la base
Une base qui oublie comment elle a trouvé un travail ne peut pas être vérifiée. Voici les voies qui ont admis celui-ci.
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Fragile states are a broadly understood concept, within which one may include a variety of related terms including, but not limited to: weak states, failing and states, collapsed states, difficult partners, difficult environments, and Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS).1 Fragile states lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home and abroad. Although considerable research and resources have been devoted to states in the last two decades, a lack of time series data on state has prevented researchers from examining why certain countries remain trapped in for extended periods of time, while others move in and out of fragility, or yet still, why some countries exit and are now emergent or stabilized. This article will tackle this issue by examining case studies of three types of states. In evaluating our data over more than a thirty-year period, we find that several countries are part of a group of and states that are perpetually stuck in a fragility trap. These countries show little indication of lifting themselves out of their political, economic, and social malaise; they are some of the biggest recipients of Western aid dollars and, despite being resource rich in some cases, have the lowest per capita incomes in the world. Given that some of the worst performers have experienced protracted conflict, the real costs associated with these countries is much higher than simply tallying aid figures-instead, conflict management, regional instability, and loss of life and infrastructure must be factored in.Fragile states, including those that are trapped, represent an unmet challenge to social science and policy; dominant frameworks and projects do not satisfactorily explain their dynamics and changes over time.2 These states are a compelling area of study for several policy-relevant reasons. First, they are by definition characterized by unstable policy environments, which make engagement a long-term challenge. Second, they are defined by their level of structural complexity, making policy intervention difficult. Third, neglecting states can be extremely costly in terms of poverty, the spread of disease and crime, and in terms of their impact on neighboring countries. Fourth, populations living in states are further from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) than any others on the planet.3In this paper, state can be understood as a composite measure of all aspects of state performance, producing a ranking that would be most closely associated with those countries that have typically failed at the top of the list. This would be a list that most policymakers and academics would recognize, and indeed if one surveys the vast literature on and the various rankings available it is clear that such lists do not vary considerably in terms of which countries appear at the top.4 Cases such as Somalia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan are perpetually present regardless of which index is consulted. Most of the thirty to fifty so-called fragile states are experiencing or have experienced large-scale violence, and most suffer from internal challenges to their authority structures. The result to date has been a number of studies that limit themselves mostly to a specific case study approach. Though clearly valuable, this methodological choice has limited our understanding of the broader context of state processes. Without a suitable integrative and comparative framework, research conducted from a theoretical perspective on states cannot provide the proper context for sound resource allocation.5Our program of research is premised on the idea that state is a convergence of structural changes and events that might include large-scale conflict, disengaged leadership, failure to provide long-term service delivery, or the loss of legitimacy leading to political collapse. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle