Notice bibliographique
Résumé
When I founded the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy in the mid-1980s, Hispanic America was a largely unknown and underappreciated force on the American political landscape. Some demographers were beginning to note that our growth trajectory across the nation was potentially game changing, but the vast majority of American policy makers, opinion leaders, and the broader public was mostly ignorant of our impending national significance. At that time, Latinos (then only 6 percent of the national population, compared to more than 16 percent now) were mainly concentrated in a handful of cities and states and largely seen as a population of non-English speaking immigrants. Positive media representations of Latinos were almost nonexistent, and there were few policy leaders with a Hispanic background or expertise in national policy-making circles. In effect, the U.S. Latino community was neither positioned as nor seen to be a major factor in American public life. Now, a generation later, the nation is waking up to the reality that, looking to the future, as Latinos go, so goes our nation. Indeed, after a long wait dating back to the founding of the United States and its extension westward, our community has finally come of age. One part of the equation is the Latino population's rapid growth in recent years and the projection of even greater numerical increases and geographic dispersion of our population in the years to come. By 2050, Latinos are expected to make up fully one-quarter of the national population. As important as our raw numbers are, however, so is our community's growing prevalence in virtually all corners of the nation, especially in the states most influential in presidential elections: California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. As recently failed Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney learned, and the nation with him, it is no longer possible for any presidential hopeful of either party to be elected without winning the majority of these states; and it is no longer possible to win any of these key electoral states without the support of a majority of Latino voters. As we also saw in 2012, this trend is increasingly characteristic of major senatorial and statewide campaigns for office. In essence, within a single generation, Latinos have gone from being a forgotten and marginalized minority to an essential swing voting bloc in the nation's most important elections. Hispanic Americans still have a long way to go to achieve political, economic, and social equality. To be sure, Hispanic school completion rates are still too low, and Latino health and economic mobility indices remain disturbing in the early twenty-first century. Anti-immigrant sentiment and related hate crimes directed mainly at Latinos also remain significant concerns. Political representation of Latinos in policy-making fields, though increasing steadily, continues to be too low. Despite these lingering realities, no one can doubt that Latinos are suddenly a large factor in our national life and that we are making remarkable progress. The implications of these developments are huge. They mean that, one day soon, America will elect a Latino president. They mean that, one day in the not-too-distant future, more and more influential states across the land will elect Hispanic governors, U.S. senators, mayors, and other high-ranking policy officials. As all of these changes occur, Latino men and women will have the opportunity for the first time in U.S. history to affect the major policies that will define the American future. Our emergence as a political force across the land is not merely a product of our growing numbers and reach as a community. It is also a result of the significant gains we have made in recent decades in creating essential mediating institutions that have leveraged our talents and perspectives in fields ranging from law and the media to education and philanthropy. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».