Understanding China's Administrative Reform
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Résumé
ABSTRACT This article discusses China's current administrative reform in its historical context. By relating the present to the past, some seemingly paradoxical questions become answerable. Through a review of the impetus, constraints, and measures of China's reform efforts during the Different periods of time, the author concludes that the depth, pace, and prospects of China's reform hinge upon China's governing system's ability to smoothly, effectively, and timely rejuvenate its bureaucracy as well as its paramount leadership. INTRODUCTION Reform is a catchword that has swept through the world in the past two decades. Governments and businesses alike have all been under heavy pressure for reform and reinvention. This worldwide movement started with Margaret Thatcher's privatization initiative in 1979, was expanded by Reagan's small drive during his years of presidency between 1981 and 1989, and was reoriented by Clinton's reinventing the government in 1993. Reforms of various types have also found their way into Canada, South America, Australia, New Zealand, and many European countries. During this period of time, the world has witnessed many events of global significance such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the election of black activist Nelson Mandela as president in South Africa, and the Asian economy crisis. These events triggered further reform in these regions. China's recent administrative reform coincided with, and has been reinvigorated by the world's reform movement. Since 1978, when Deng Ziaoping, China's reform champion, initiated his massive project of economic reform, China's administrative apparatus has been under constant pressure for reform. A series of reform efforts have been initiated, the most notable of which include the 1982-1983 administrative reform, the 1988 administrative reform, the 1993 administrative reform, and the 1998 administrative reform. Many welcomed China's leap onto the bandwagon of reform and cheered for its initiatives. This attitude was apparent on the major western magazines and newspapers prior to the year of 1989. However, after the 1989 Tiananmen Student Movement, views about the prospects of China's reform started to diverge. While there is no denying that China's economic reform has brought about fast economic growth and plenty of social changes, diverging views exist as to whether China's reform will lead it into an era of sustained development, prosperity, and friendly partner in international affairs. Some see on the horizon a rising economic power dominated by authoritarian rule growing into a new threat to international peace (Roy, 19941 Bernstein and Rose, 1997). Others simply doubt whether China has the ability to reinvent itself and see China as being trapped in a hopeless system of the dominance of one party organized on Marxist-Leninist principles. They believe that China's leaders have never been fully committed to the level of change necessary for making a difference and argue that, unless there is a much more fundamental social changeone that is typically characterized as a revolution-China is de facto the ir-reformable (Lingle, 1997). Conversations with many of China's senior intellectuals, however, have revealed a wait-and-see attitude and are hopeful of a positive reform outcome but want to wait until they see the results before getting excited about it. Indeed, in spite of the series of administrative reform efforts in recent decades, many old problems still linger and new problems emerge. Hope, disappointment, and doubt coexist while the world watches the giant country making its twist for modernization. How are these divergent views justified? Has China made good progress in its reforms? If yes, why had additional reform been necessary at such short intervals? If not, why have efforts been continuously made for reforming the irreformable? …
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|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,000 |
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| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
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