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Enregistrement W981331470 · doi:10.55016/ojs/sppp.v8i1.42527

The Structure and Presentation of Provincial Budgets

2015· article· en· W981331470 sur OpenAlexaffabout
Bev Dahlby, Michael Smart

Notice bibliographique

RevueThe School of Public Policy Publications · 2015
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueCanadian Policy and Governance
Établissements canadiensUniversity of TorontoUniversity of Calgary
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésDebtScrutinyLoanEconomicsFinanceRevenueGovernment (linguistics)BusinessPolitical scienceLaw

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Provincial governments seem to consider it only natural to finance public infrastructure using debt. There is a standard arsenal of arguments used to justify the practice, to the point where there are scarcely any political voices willing to dissent from the tradition. Financing a bridge or school with debt is like a family buying a house, goes one common rationalization, or like a business taking out a loan for equipment. Others argue that infrastructure investment can stimulate the economy and pays for itself over time. Another justification insists that it is only fair for future generations to shoulder some of the burden of infrastructure purchased today, since they will continue to enjoy it after living generations are gone. Still another holds that debt financing infrastructure offers the necessary smoothing of the tax rate over time. These arguments are widely repeated and accepted as these arguments are, but under closer scrutiny they hold almost no water at all. On the contrary, the economic analysis casts doubts on financing infrastructure using debt. If provinces want to build more roads, bridges, schools, airports, hospitals, and other infrastructure, they would do taxpayers a much bigger favour by financing it through current income. Building a government hospital is not the same as a couple taking out a home mortgage; that couple cannot increase its revenues the way a government can through higher taxes, and that couple has an earning life cycle (rising until the earners are in their mid-50s, and then declining until their income is largely comprised of public and private pensions and savings). Businesses primarily fund new investments using retained earnings; their use of debt is motivated largely by tax incentives that allow interest deductibility. Neither of these are reasonable comparisons for a government’s financing rationale. The fiscal stimulus argument is weak to begin with, as the timing of infrastructure spending is often too slow to be effective during a recession. It is a particularly so in Alberta, where unemployment rates are low and skilled labour is already at a shortage. And the idea that it is somehow fair to saddle future generations with paying for infrastructure they did not vote to build is problematic and permits current generations the ability to be more reckless than they might otherwise. But more to the point, most of the benefits of infrastructure is enjoyed by the generations who are living when it is built; less than 20 per cent of its utility accrues to unborn generations. Furthermore, the tax-smoothing argument implies that taxes should be increased (or other current spending cut) to finance an infrastructure program so that the present value of fiscal surpluses cover the debt incurred in financing construction — the key to satisfying the condition of debt solvency. Some infrastructure does “pay for itself” — when user fees or tolls are applied — and in those cases debt financing can be justified. But this almost never happens. Despite claims to the contrary, the cost of a school or a hospital can never be recouped in the higher productivity and wealth it might bring to the jurisdiction, since income taxes (particularly in Alberta) are so low. Therefore, when a province announces that it plans to build things, it should also indicate how it will raise the necessary funding to pay for it, rather than borrowing. This is not a message that provincial politicians will want to hear; indeed, their entire budgeting model — based on accrual accounting and capital budgeting — is predicated on the assumption that infrastructure is an asset rather than an expense, despite the fact that maintenance costs make every infrastructure project an ongoing obligation. This model — in part the result of balanced-budget rules — is the primary reason why the public finds provincial budgets to be notoriously incomprehensible. The self-imposed balanced-budget rules adopted by provincial governments are often only a symbolic gesture. If provincial governments want to be truly accountable to taxpayers, they should be prepared to finance a significant portion of the actual upfront cost of infrastructure out of current revenues and provide a more transparent cash-based accounting of revenues and expenditures in their budgets.

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,009
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesMétarecherche
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Théorique ou conceptuel · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,792
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,999

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,009
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0010,001
Communication savante0,0000,001
Science ouverte0,0010,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,039
Tête enseignante GPT0,335
Écart entre enseignants0,296 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Devis d'étudeThéorique ou conceptuel
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations3
Publié2015
Routes d'admission2
Résumé présentoui

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