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Record W118265052

AUCTION AND NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS FOR MULTI-ATTRIBUTE E-PROCUREMENT TRANSACTIONS

2014· article· en· W118265052 on OpenAlexaff
Shikui Wu, Gregory E. Kersten, Rustam Vahidov

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of the Association for Information Systems · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsConcordia UniversityUniversity of Windsor
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceIncentive compatibilityMechanism designProcurementNegotiationOrder (exchange)Common value auctionIncentiveRisk analysis (engineering)Process managementBusinessMarketingMicroeconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This study focuses on mechanism design in order to solve multi-attribute e-procurement problems. In particularly, this study addresses two realistic requirements in mechanism design: (1) specifications of request/proposal on multiple attributes, and (2) incentive compatibility on information exchange/disclosure. Taking into account the needs and emergence of advanced mechanisms in eprocurement, this study presents a generic process model for the design of two feasible classes of mechanisms: multi-attribute reverse auctions and multi-attribute multi-bilateral negotiations. It allows buyers to control preference representation and information revelation, assuring that suppliers obtain sufficient information in making effective proposals while protecting confidential information. Then, it defines a set of design parameters that can be used to design and implement variants of specific mechanisms in these two classes of mechanisms. This study has implications to the research and practice in e-procurement by providing a systematic approach in designing multi-attribute mechanisms and addressing specific business requirements and strategic concerns.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.009
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.003
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.992
Threshold uncertainty score0.475

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0090.003
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.002
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.074
GPT teacher head0.341
Teacher spread0.267 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2014
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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