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Record W1486595332 · doi:10.1109/hicss.2015.42

Improving Successful A+B Procurement Auctions with Negotiations

2015· article· en· W1486595332 on OpenAlexaff
Gregory E. Kersten

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionMicroeconomicsNegotiationPaymentSocial WelfareProcurementExpected utility hypothesisUnique bid auctionReverse auctionVickrey–Clarke–Groves auctionRevenue equivalenceAuction theoryComputer scienceEnglish auctionBusinessEconomicsMathematical economicsFinanceMarketing

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In A+B procurement auctions the buyer's utility is linear and the bidders' utility is assumed to be quasi-linear. If this assumption is met, then a successful auction may conclude with an efficient winning bid which maximizes both the buyer's utility and social welfare. If this assumption is not met, then an auction is either efficient and maximizes social welfare or it maximizes the buyer's utility. If the bidders are risk-averse, then a winning bid that maximizes the buyer's utility may be further improved through negotiations. It is possible to introduce side-payments which increase utility values of both the buyer and the seller.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.015
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.048
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.015
Threshold uncertainty score0.078

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0150.048
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.002
Bibliometrics0.0020.003
Science and technology studies0.0020.002
Scholarly communication0.0050.009
Open science0.0040.009
Research integrity0.0040.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0090.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.152
GPT teacher head0.384
Teacher spread0.232 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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