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Socially excessive dissemination of patent licences

2009· article· en· W1487203310 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Anthony Creane

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicIntellectual Property and Patents
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMonopolyIncentiveProfit (economics)BusinessSocial costCommerceEconomicsLaw and economicsMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract Compared with the social optimum, a monopolist usually sells too little. This result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation: Katz and Shapiro (1986) find ‘conditions under which [the lab] will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences.’ However, I find instead that its incentives can be socially too high; the monopoly seller may sell too much. For example, it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences, while it is socially optimal that none is sold.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.054
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.013
Threshold uncertainty score0.045

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.054
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.003
Scholarly communication0.0040.003
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0130.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.254
GPT teacher head0.190
Teacher spread0.064 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économiqueSame topicIntellectual Property and PatentsFrench-language works237,207