MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W1502128320 · doi:10.1145/2790133

Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players

2015· article· en· W1502128320 on OpenAlexafffund
Hadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy

Bibliographic record

VenueACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2015
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Waterloo
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of CanadaOntario Ministry of Research, Innovation and Science
KeywordsIncentive compatibilityMechanism designMathematical optimizationComputer scienceBayesian probabilityCommon value auctionIncentivePaymentProcurementMechanism (biology)Black boxBayesian gameGame theoryMathematicsArtificial intelligenceMathematical economicsEconomicsRepeated gameMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by the mechanism. We formulate a notion of incentive compatibility (IC) that we call support-based IC that is substantially more robust than Bayesian IC, and develop black-box reductions from support-based-IC mechanism design to algorithm design. For single-dimensional settings, this black-box reduction applies even when we only have an LP-relative approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem. Thus, we obtain near-optimal mechanisms for various covering settings, including single-dimensional covering problems, multi-item procurement auctions, and multidimensional facility location.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.660
Threshold uncertainty score0.331

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.137
GPT teacher head0.303
Teacher spread0.166 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2015
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueACM Transactions on Economics and ComputationSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207