Reflections on Continuous Reporting and Auditing/Réflexions Sur L'Information Continue Et La VÉrification En Continu
Bibliographic record
Abstract
ABSTRACT Our contribution to this forum focuses on “Other Continuous Reporting Obligations” from section 4 of Maintaining Quality Capital Markets through Quality Information ("Maintaining Quality"). With support from academic research, we comment on three themes from other parts of Maintaining Quality that carry into section 4's focus on continuous disclosure: the quality and value of information for capital market users, the role of regulation, and the role of auditing. Our remarks are necessarily limited, but we hope they add to Maintaining Quality's impetus to more intensive study of the various issues. We conclude that continuous reporting, the management discussion and analysis (MD&A), and other reporting beyond the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) financial statements appear to provide value to capital markets on their own and by enhancing or anticipating the GAAP reporting. We say “appear” because there is, as yet, little research to substantiate this value or to establish the link between quality of reporting beyond GAAP and value to users or preparers. The largely qualitative nature of such continuous reporting complicates measuring and assessing its quality, even aside from a possible user preference for quantitative over qualitative information. It is unclear whether adding to disclosure regulation or requiring an audit of continuous reporting will improve quality and value. A compliance mentality by preparers might result in less forthcoming and less informative disclosure, and even less binding guidance may not enhance continuous reporting quality. Finally, we offer some views about the problematic role of auditing in improving value given constraints such as those in independence rules. RÉSUMÉ La contribution des auteurs au forum porte sur les autres obligations d'information continue de la section 4 du document sur le rôle de la qualité de l'information dans le maintien de la qualité des marchés financiers. En s'appuyant sur les recherches universitaires, les auteurs commentent trois thèmes issus d'autres sections du rapport qui conduisent au sujet traité à la section 4: la qualité et la valeur de l'information pour les utilisateurs des marchés financiers, le rôle de la réglementation et le rôle de la vérification. Malgré leurs inévitables limites, leurs observations, espèrent‐ils, contribueront à ce que l'étude des diverses questions soulevées par le rapport soit poussée plus loin. Les auteurs en viennent à la conclusion que l'information continue, le rapport de gestion et la communication d'autres informations, au‐delà des états financiers conformes aux PCGR, semblent créer de la valeur pour les marchés financiers par leur qualité propre et parce qu'ils améliorent ou devancent l'information conforme aux PCGR. «Semblent», disentils, parce que peu de travaux de recherche viennent étayer cette valeur ou établir le lien entre la qualité de l'information au‐delà de celle qu'exigent les PCGR et sa valeur pour les utilisateurs ou les auteurs. Étant donné la nature essentiellement qualitative de cette information continue, il est difficile d'en mesurer et d'en évaluer la qualité, sans compter la préférence possible des utilisateurs pour l'information quantitative. Il n'est pas clairement établi qu'une réglementation accrue en matière d'information ou qu'une obligation de vérification de l'information continue améliorerait cette qualité et cette valeur. L'attachement des préparateurs au principe de conformité pourrait aboutir à une information moins ouverte et moins éclairante, et même des lignes directrices moins contraignantes risqueraient de ne pas améliorer la qualité de l'information continue. Enfin, les auteurs énoncent diverses opinions au sujet du rôle problématique de la vérification dans l'amélioration de la valeur, compte tenu de contraintes comme celles des règles d'indépendance.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.046 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".