The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present
Bibliographic record
Abstract
David Runciman The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to Present Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013If there is a single political topic that has been subject of more intellectual and popular discussion, of more private and public concern and, on occasion, a greater cause of hope or despair over past few centuries, I'd be interested in hearing what it is. Ever since European Enlightenment (dates uncertain but probably not earlier than mid- seventeenth century nor much later than late eighteenth century), purveyors of optimism and promoters of progress have insisted that humanity, despite our seemingly universal tendency to engage in unpleasantness of racism, caste and class oppression and misogyny and so on, is not only capable of improvement, but destined for it.The Enlightenment by which, in European case, is not meant a kind of vaguely metaphysical awakening to spiritual meaning of universe, but rather a rational, practical, scientific and increasingly technological approach to life. It was a revolutionary transformation not only of thought in Great Britain, European continent and its several settler colonies in North America and elsewhere, but also of elsewhere as imperialism brought all alleged benefits of European society to what those self- same Europeans condescendingly called natives, savages or, in Kipling's charming phrase breeds without law who lived beyond pale, never mind that Kipling was actually talking about Germans (Orwell, 1946) and that the pale referred to limits of assured English control in Ireland in fourteenth century.The promise of Enlightenment was, at least in retrospect, was almost irresistible: science and technology portended an end to communicable disease and an increase in efficient communication and transportation; industrial development implied an end to poverty, initially at home and eventually abroad; market economy was touted as vehicle through which economic equity and affordable products could be made available to any competent citizen willing to adopt an ethic of hard work and deferred gratification (an attitude ascribed to Protestants above all); mass and, eventually, universal education would dispel ignorance and superstition; and, finally, gradual democratization would ensure elimination of tyranny and ensure political constitutions increasingly committed to rule of law, judicial due process, representative and responsible government with right to vote eventually extended to all citizens. It was an impressive agenda.We are all, of course, aware of roots of democracy in ancient Athens. We seldom recall, however, that it was a relatively short-lived experiment and few of us acknowledge that among its most visceral opponents was legendary philosopher, Socrates. Nonetheless, we seem willing to connect democratic Athens (in which not much more than 5% of population actually had right to participate, since women and slaves were not invited to general assembly) to English parish meetings, New England town meetings, a few Swiss cantons and ultimately to electronic voting in Internet-besotted North America today. We neglect to remind ourselves that now common right to vote was recently deeply feared by aristocracies, passionately desired by an emergent bourgeoisie and a distant hope for women and working class who, in their dreams, may have thought that being a majority of population might one day work to provide governments more interested in assisting than in oppressing them.David Runciman's book, The Confidence Trap, tells modern story of how democracy was won and how it (just barely) prevailed not just over lesser angels of demos or the mob to whom democratic institutions seemed to entrust final decision making, but also (by an even thinner margin) over great totalitarian movements of twentieth century headed by leaders as diverse as Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin, Adolph Hitler, Mao Zedong and such lesser luminaries as Francisco Franco in Spain, Antonio Salazar in Portugal and any number of Latin American dictators-to name just a few. …
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".