Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students
Bibliographic record
Abstract
After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemesuniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives,work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship betweenexecutive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence ofshifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of areal effort experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company notonly show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest thatthe sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiencyafter the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategyrather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearingperformance driven while students are more cost driven.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.010 | 0.032 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.006 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".