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Record W1575204797 · doi:10.3982/te760

An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

2012· article· en· W1575204797 on OpenAlexaff
Marcin Pęski

Bibliographic record

VenueTheoretical Economics · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsFolk theoremRepeated gameMathematical economicsPeriod (music)Bounded functionMathematicsGame theoryPrivate information retrievalNash equilibriumEconomicsEquilibrium selectionStatisticsMathematical analysis

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, and that the monitoring is sufficiently connected. In all repeated game equilibria, each period play is an equilibrium of the stage game. When the monitoring is approximately connected and equilibrium strategies have a uniformly bounded past, then each period play is an approximate equilibrium of the stage game.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.023
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.028

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.023
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.003
Scholarly communication0.0030.008
Open science0.0020.002
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.058
GPT teacher head0.347
Teacher spread0.289 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations11
Published2012
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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