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Record W1575734909

Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction

2010· preprint· en· W1575734909 on OpenAlexaff
René Kirkegaard

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2010
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Guelph
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCONTESTCompetitor analysisMicroeconomicsCommon value auctionProcurementComplete informationEconomicsAction (physics)BusinessLaw and economicsMarketingPolitical scienceLaw
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In many contests a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be advantageous. Examples include a ¢ rmative action and biased procurement policies. In this paper, however, I show that some of the supposed bene ciaries may in fact become worse o ¤ when the favored group is diverse. The rea-son is that the other favored contestants become more aggressive, which may outweigh the advantage that is gained over contestants who do not receive preferential treat-ment. The contest is modelled as an incomplete-information all-pay auction in which contestants have heterogenous and non-linear cost functions. A source of uncertainty, such as incomplete information, is crucial for the results.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.964
Threshold uncertainty score0.556

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.113
GPT teacher head0.418
Teacher spread0.306 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designOther design
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations4
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

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