MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort

Retailers and consumers in sequential auctions of collectibles

2007· article· en· W1577339577 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Stéphanie Vincent Lyk‐Jensen, Olivier Chanel

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · 2007
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBiddingCommon value auctionMicroeconomicsEconomicsRevenueValue (mathematics)Unit (ring theory)Vickrey auctionAuction theoryComputer scienceMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract. We analyse an independent private‐value model, where heterogeneous bidders compete for objects sold in sequential second‐price auctions. In this heterogeneous game, bidders may have differently distributed valuations, and some have multi‐unit demand with decreasing marginal values (retailers); others have a specific single‐unit demand (consumers). By examining equilibrium bidding strategies and price sequences, we show that the presence of consumers leads to more aggressive bidding from the retailers on average and heterogeneous bidders is a plausible explanation of the price decline effect. The study of the expected revenue of the seller confirms the interest of auctioneers in inviting different types of bidders.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.923
Threshold uncertainty score0.954

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.288
GPT teacher head0.268
Teacher spread0.020 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations6
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économiqueSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207