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Record W158786181 · doi:10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7710

Comparing Position Auctions Computationally

2010· article· en· W158786181 on OpenAlexaff
David R. M. Thompson, Kevin Leyton‐Brown

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionPosition (finance)Nash equilibriumComputer sciencePoint (geometry)Mathematical economicsPreferenceSelection (genetic algorithm)Equilibrium selectionMathematical optimizationMicroeconomicsEconomicsEconometricsGame theoryMathematicsArtificial intelligenceRepeated game

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Modern techniques for representing games and computing their Nash equilibria are approaching the point where they can be used to analyze market games. We demonstrate this by showing how the equilibria of different position auction mechanisms can be tractably identified using these techniques. These results enable detailed and quantitative comparisons of the different auction mechanisms — in terms of both efficiency and revenue — under different preference models and equilibrium selection criteria.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.043
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.017
Threshold uncertainty score0.056

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.043
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.003
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0050.010
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0170.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.216
GPT teacher head0.399
Teacher spread0.183 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial IntelligenceSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207