Independence and Accountability in Supervision Comparing Central Banks and Financial Authorities
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Unlike the monetary policy function – nowadays, invariably the core function of a central bank – the financial supervisory function is being performed by a variety of institutions for whom there is less consensus about the governance model than for central banks. This chapter sheds light on recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance, with special attention to the position of the central bank. We first identify similarities and differences in the theoretical approaches to the two key features of governance for central banks and supervisors – independence and accountability. We then disentangle empirically the institutional differences between supervisory regimes governed by central banks and other institutional arrangements. The analysis of the determinants of independence and accountability arrangements for supervisors indicates that (1) the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements; (2) politicians' decisions regarding the degree of independence and accountability seem to be driven by different sets of considerations; and (3) the likelihood for establishing governance arrangements suitable for the supervisory task seems to be higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank. Introduction During the past 30 years, the monetary policy mandate of central banks has been narrowing significantly. In a large number of countries, the central bank mandate is now exclusively geared toward the goal of price stability. All other goals that were explicit at some point in history, such as achieving broader economic goals, gradually shed their importance.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.021 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".