Bibliographic record
Abstract
In many employment relationships, employees ’ contributions to firm value are not con-tractible. Firms therefore need to use alternative mechanisms to provide their employees with incentives. This paper investigates and contrasts two alternatives for a firm to pro-vide effort incentives: (i) to subjectively evaluate the employee’s performance; and (ii), to delegate the performance evaluation to a supervisor as a neutral party. Supervision gener-ates contractible information about the employee’s performance, but could result in vertical collusion. This paper demonstrates that supervision can be optimal whenever firms cannot perfectly identify employees ’ contributions to firm value. This can be observed despite ensuring collusion-proofness is shown to impose additional cost on firms in form of too low-powered incentives and inefficiently high fixed payments to employees and supervi-sors. Thus, this paper provides a supplementary rationale for the dominance of multi-level organizational hierarchies in practise.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.027 | 0.069 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.009 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".